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# **Statistical analysis of female migration and labour market integration in the EU**

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**Integration of Female Immigrants in Labour Market and Society.  
Policy Assessment and Policy Recommendations**

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<sup>1</sup> The UK team was assisted by Tesfaye Gojjie in the collection of some of the data.

## **Introduction**

The countries of the EU have a long history of migration, both outwards and inwards. The general consensus is that inward migration has on the whole made a positive contribution to economic, social and cultural life in the EU and has increased entrepreneurship, innovation and labour market flexibility. Inward migration also has a positive effect on aggregate demand and this, combined with the supply-side changes noted above, has had a positive effect on employment and contributed to economic growth. Within the overall pattern of European migration, the form, composition and dynamics have varied across member states and over time. During the 1990s net immigration became the largest component of population change in most countries of the EU15 (EC 2003b:9). Immigration to the EU15 has also broadened and diversified in terms of the characteristics of migrants, the patterns and flows and the mix of sending and receiving countries (ibid.). Member states that formerly experienced outward net migration (Southern Europe and Ireland) became countries of net inward migration, consisting of returning nationals as well as non-nationals both from other EU states and (mainly) from third countries.

This report is primarily concerned with the integration of female migrants into the labour market and society of EU member states. Female migration has always been an important component of inward migration into Europe and this has continued to be the case in recent years with women accounting for approximately half of all migrants entering the EU. Many females migrate for family union/reunion but increasingly they are motivated by work or study and mainly travel of their own volition. In contrast, other migrant women have been forced to migrate in order to escape situations that affect their security or livelihood. Moreover, a significant number of new migrants are, or become, irregular and some are trafficked and these have consequences in terms of their integration into the labour market. Many female migrants are employed in the informal economy, particularly as domestic workers, care workers, nurses or entertainers, reinforcing traditional gender segregation and inequalities in the labour market.

Within the EU a number of skill and labour shortages have appeared since the early 1990s and in the context of growing competition in the global economy and demographic ageing it is likely that immigration will continue to be necessary for the foreseeable future. The EU is increasingly moving towards managing the form, level and pattern of inward migration and some countries have introduced selective-employment-related immigration policies. At the same time there is growing recognition that this needs to be combined with pro-active policies to facilitate integration into employment but as the evidence produced in this report shows, much still needs to be done.

## **Measuring Migration**

It is difficult to measure accurately the scale and patterns of migration (European Commission 2005b). Member states differ in the way they produce and monitor the migration statistics and who is regarded as a migrant. Moreover, the methods of collection vary across member states. Sometimes they are based on administrative data, for example information gathered on the number of residence permits issued or from population registers. Some member states provide data derived from border surveys, such as the International Passenger Survey used by the UK. There are also gaps and omissions which create difficulties when comparing the migration figures for different countries.

There are also limitations in the available labour market data which make comparative analysis difficult. National labour market data differ in their quality, breadth of coverage, method of production and also, in some cases, the definitions used. In addition, labour market

indicators refer to particular groups of migrants and minorities which, as was noted above, are often defined in different ways across member states. Notwithstanding these statistical problems we turn to consider various estimates of the level and pattern of migration and try as far as possible to focus on the relative differences between different groups in society.

## **Total Levels of Migration**

The UN has estimated that between 1990 and 2005 the number of international migrants in the world increased by 24%, rising from 154 million in 1990 to 191 million in 2005. The details are presented in Table 1. Included in these figures are an estimated 13.5 million refugees representing 7% of the world's migrant stock.

According to the UN estimates, Europe had 64 million migrants in 2005, accounting for a third of all international migrants and almost 9% of the total population of Europe.

Female migration has always been significant but the proportion of women in the world total migrant stock increased from 47.9% in 1990 to almost 50% in 2005. In Europe women accounted for 52.4% of the migrant stock in 2000.

Many European countries use nationality rather than place of birth in their demographic statistics. On the basis of this the EU estimated that there were 18.7 million legal foreign residents in EU 15 during 2000-01 and this was also reported in the Cronos data base for 2000 (Eurostat 2001). A slightly higher figure (20.1 million) is reported by the OECD's Sopemi network (OECD 2004). Of these about 5.8 millions were EU 15 citizens and another 14.3 million were third country nationals (including citizens of new member states). The Chronos and Sopemi estimates are based on foreign residents not holding citizenship in the country they were residing in during 2000-01. In contrast, the European LFS, published by Eurostat (2003) provides information for a number of countries on people born outside their country of residence and on the basis of this estimated 22.7 million born in another EU or third country in 2002. Munz (2004) reworks the LFS data and includes estimates for Germany and Italy to derive a foreign-born population of 27 million in EU 15. This is similar to the figure of 26.4 million published by the UNPD for EU 15 in 2002 (UNPD 2002). Munz (ibid.) also provides another estimate of the foreign born population of 24.9 million based on population registers and/or censuses. The details of the various estimates are presented in Table 2.

Munz (ibid.) argues that these figures underestimate the foreign born population in EU 15. By taking the highest estimates from the various sources and including estimates of irregular migrants, Munz assumes a foreign born population of 33-36 million in EU 15 in 2001-02. By including a further 1.5 million immigrants in the new member states he estimates a foreign born population of 34.5 – 37.5 million in EU25. There is no gender breakdown of the figures presented in Table 2 but on the assumption that there is a similar proportion of migrant women as estimated by the UN and reported in Table 1, this would give a figure between 18.1 and 19.7 million foreign born women in the EU25 in 2001-02.

It is more common within the EU to estimate the number and proportion of migrants in terms of the foreign or non-national populations of member states. The foreign population excludes naturalised immigrants but includes EU and non-EU nationals. Eurostat estimates that the non-national population in EU 25 member states in 2003, see Table 3, was 23.1 million amounting to almost 5.1% of the total population. Out of the 23.1 million non-nationals, almost 7.0 million (30%) were other EU nationals and 16.2 million (70%) were non-EU nationals. Broadly speaking the proportion of EU nationals in the foreign population was higher in the EU15 countries than the new member states. For example in Poland other EU nationals accounted for just over 2% of the foreign population while in Slovenia the figure

was 4.2%. In contrast the figures for Cyprus (47.6%), Sweden (43.6%), France (37.9%) and the UK (37.2%) were above the EU25 average while Greece (10.3%), Italy (12.8%), Spain (20.9%) and Portugal (21.1%) were below the average.

More recent statistics published by the European Commission (2006), see Table 4, estimate that almost 25 million non-nationals were residing in the EU25 in 2004, accounting for just below 5.5% of the total population. The countries with the largest non-national populations were Germany (7.3 million), France (3.3), Spain (2.8), the UK (2.8) and Italy 2.0). Another way of assessing the significance of the migrant population is to measure the proportion of non-nationals within the total population. Luxembourg is unusual within the EU in that over 38% of the population are non-nationals but, as Table 4 shows, apart from Luxembourg the proportion varied between 22.2 % in Latvia and 0.6% in Slovakia. Slovenia (2.3%), Poland (1.8), Portugal (2.3), Italy (3.3) and the UK (4.7) had a below average proportion of non-national residents; France (5.6), Sweden (5.3) were close to the EU average; while Germany (8.9%), Greece (8.1), Spain (6.6) and Cyprus (9.4) were above the average. Table 4 also indicates that the proportion of non-national residents increased for most countries between 1990 and 2004, although in a number of cases the proportion did not change significantly. Spain (1.0% to 6.6%), Cyprus (4.2% to 9.4%) and Greece (1.4% to 8.1%) experienced some of the biggest increases in the proportion of non-nationals and most of it was due to an increase in migration from outside the EU 25. In the case of Greece these changes were largely the result of the regularisation programmes implemented by the Greek government from the mid-1990s and similar regularisations have also been implemented in Spain. Table 4 also shows that Turkish citizens are the largest group in Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands (Turks are also the largest resident alien population overall within the EU); Albanians in Greece and Italy; and citizens of CEE or ex-USSR in Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Slovakia and Finland. In Slovenia over 90% of migrants come from the former Yugoslavia. Migrants from Ukraine, Belarus and the Russian Federation account for the majority of migrants in Poland (EC 2004a).

The differences in the size of the foreign population reflect the migration experiences of each member state. Ireland, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain became centres of net immigration in the 1990s. Variations in the level of the foreign population across member states may also reflect national policies on naturalisation (EUMC 2003). Countries with liberal naturalisation laws tend to have a smaller number of foreigners (ibid. 24). Sweden and the Netherlands are often cited as countries with liberal naturalisation laws and in both the number of foreign born is 2.2 times higher than the number of foreigners whereas in France the corresponding multiple is 1.3. In the cases of Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain regularisation programmes also had a significant effect on the size of the non-national population.

The citizenship composition of the EU population varies greatly between member states. Geographical proximity is an important determinant of the direction of migration but the composition of non-nationals in each member state also reflects the history of the country and the cultural and political links, including previous migration, that have developed over time. More recently, and particularly since the early 1990s, most EU countries have experienced an increasing diversification of countries of origin, largely related to the growing level of asylum migration (EUMC 2003:27).

Table 5 presents a gender breakdown of the citizenship of non-EU nationals living in the EU15 in 2000. There are five country groups of citizenship: Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) plus ex-USSR; Turkey, Malta and Cyprus; Other Europe; Africa; and Others. Table 5 indicates that in 2000 approximately 27% of women of non-EU nationality and 24% of men within the EU came from CEE and the former Soviet Union. Most of this group were concentrated in bordering countries. For example in Greece they accounted for over 80% of both women and men of non-EU nationality residing in the country, in Austria the corresponding figures were 66.4% for women and 63.7% for men and in Finland 71.3% and

59.1% respectively. In Germany 37.5% of non-EU national women and 31.7% of non-EU national men came from CEE and ex-USSR and in Sweden the corresponding figures were 37.9% and 28.3%. In contrast Belgium, Spain, France, Portugal and the UK had less than 10% non-EU nationals from CEE plus ex-USSR.

Another 22% of women and 25% of men of non-EU nationality in the EU15 came from Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, with the latter accounting for the vast majority and mainly concentrated in Germany, the Netherlands and Austria. A further 22% of women and 24% of men came from Africa and were heavily concentrated in France (mainly Moroccans and Algerians) and Portugal (accounting for over two-thirds in each), Belgium (accounting for about a half) and Spain, Italy and the Netherlands (accounting for about one third in each). In the UK, Asians and those of Caribbean origin accounted for almost half of women and men of non-EU nationality.

Table 6 gives further details of the main groups of non-nationals and the changing composition of the non-national population between 1990 and 2004 for selected EU countries. Apart from Greece the composition of the non-national population appears to have remained fairly stable for the countries covered in Table 6. The five largest groups of non-nationals in Germany are Turks, ex-Yugoslavs, Italians, Greeks and Poles and this pattern did not change between 1990 and 2004. Former colonies make up the largest groups of non-nationals in Portugal with Cape Verde and Brazil at the top in both 1990 and 2003 followed by Angola and Guinea Bissau in 2003. The composition of Greece's non-national population changed significantly between 1994 and 2001. In 1994 the largest groups were from the US, the UK, Russia, Germany and Poland but in 2001 the largest groups were from Albanian, Bulgaria, Georgia and Romania with the US in fifth position. Citizens from other parts of the former Yugoslavia made up most of the non-national population in Slovenia in 2004 and in the case of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, the non-nationals were mainly from CEE and the ex-USSR.

In terms of the geographical distribution of migrants, the majority tend to reside in urban areas and in particular are often concentrated in the major metropolitan centres such as London, Athens and Ile-de-France. There are diverse reasons for this related to both pull and push factors. Firstly, migrants go to those areas where there are labour shortages. Secondly, migrants often follow a pattern of 'chain migration', joining family members and/or taking advantage of ethnic and social networks to gain access to employment opportunities. In addition to urban migration, a considerable number of migrants are employed in rural areas, often as seasonal/temporary workers in agriculture. Such temporary migration is particularly important in Southern and Eastern Europe (Southern Italy, Northern Greece, Andalusia in Spain and Poland) but it is also increasingly important in other member states within the EU.

## **Migration Flows**

In the preceding section we discussed the changes in the total level or stock of migration in the EU and in this section we turn to consider the corresponding flows of migration. Before doing so we note that in the period since 1960 the population of the countries that now form the EU25 grew from 376 million (1960) to almost 460 million (2005). Between 1990 and 2001 the annual growth of the population in EU25 averaged about 1 million (0.2%). Recent estimates by Eurostat (EC 2005b) point to a rise in the EU25 population of almost 2 million (0.42%) in 2003 and 2.3 million (0.5%) in 2004. Most of the rise in the EU25 population during 2003 and 2004 occurred in Spain, Italy and the UK and was mainly due to higher net migration.

Table 7 gives details of net migration over the period 1992 to 2005. Net migration averaged 0.17% of the EU25 population annually between 1992 and 2000, increased to 1.311 million (0.29%) in 2001, to 1.981 million (0.46%) in 2003 and then fell to 1.691 million (0.37%) in 2005. Table 7 also shows that the scale and trend of net migration is markedly different across member states. Most EU countries have experienced a rise in net migration in recent years but not all. The rate of net migration declined in Germany and remained marginally negative in Poland between 1992 and 2005.

In recent years the highest levels of net migration in relative terms have occurred in the Southern European countries of Cyprus (2.72% in 2005), Spain (1.5%) and Italy (0.58%). In contrast, in addition to Poland (-0.3), Latvia (-0.5), Lithuania ((-3.0) and Estonia (-0.3) also had negative net migration in 2005. Four member states, Spain (652,300), Italy (338,100), the UK (196,300) and Germany (98,500) received approximately three-quarters of the net inflow into EU25 in 2005. A large part of the net migration into the UK over the last two years (2004-06) seems to have arrived from new member states. Prior to the EU enlargement in 2004 all member states, apart from Sweden, Ireland and the UK, introduced transition periods on immigration ranging between 2 and 7 years in order to control potential migrant workers from the 10 new EU countries. Recent data reported by the BBC (2006) shows that between May 2004 and May 2006 the UK and Ireland issued an estimated 500,000 work permits for new member countries consisting of 300,000 (60%) from Poland and 110,000 (22%) from Latvia although there is also evidence that over 50,000 were already in the UK before 1 May 2004 and since then many have returned to their country of origin after completing a period of work in the UK. The increased rate of net migration in Southern Europe was mainly for employment purposes in Italy (61% in 2000), Portugal (46%) and Spain (36%).

Net migration accounts for about 80% of the population growth that has occurred in the EU25 since the mid-1990s and this figure reached 84% in 2005. Without migration a number of member states, including Germany and Italy, would have experienced a fall in population over the last decade. Moreover, if the slowdown in the natural rate of increase continues into the future it is likely that the overall population of the EU over the coming decades will be determined by the scale of immigration. This is particularly relevant given the projected fall in the EU's labour force after 2010.

Eurostat (EC 2003a) estimated that about 45% of the flow of migrants in the second half of the 1990s were women, although women accounted for almost 50% when Germany is excluded. However, more recent data provided by Oso and Garson (2005) indicate a growing feminisation of migration flows. Women accounted for the majority of migrants who had been living in a number of OECD countries for 5 years or less in 2004 and this was particularly pronounced in Poland (68%), Italy (63), the Netherlands (58), Portugal (57) and Greece (56) (ibid.8). Table 8 also confirms the growing feminisation of migration flows in a number of OECD countries. Comparing the proportion of women among immigrants who had arrived within 10 years in 1994 and 2004 there is evidence that the proportion was growing in several countries between the two dates. Thus, for example, the proportion of female immigrants rose from 48% to 56% in Austria between 1994 and 2004 and the corresponding figures for Italy were 49% and 55%.

Data on immigrants by country of previous residence are only available for some countries and for some of the years 1995 to 1999. There is no data for France over the period 1995-99 and incomplete data for Greece and Portugal. The available (incomplete) data reveals that on average for the period about 18% of all migrants into the EU were citizens of other EU member countries (17% of women and 19% of men); 27% were returning nationals (29% of women and 26% of men); and 54% were non-EU nationals (53% of women and 54% of men). There was considerable variation in the scale of non-EU migration into member states over the period 1995-99 (ibid.) Germany was the destination for 58% of men and 48% of women

of non-EU nationality. Non-EU nationals added about 0.3% per year on average to the population of the EU15 (excluding France) over the period.

Within the EU25 there is a significant disparity in the age structures of the national and foreign populations. A relatively large number of immigrants are aged between 20-30 while relatively few (less than 15%) are aged 40 years and over. Many in their 20s come to study while others seek employment. Statistics for 2002 recently released by Eurostat (EC 2006) indicate that there are proportionately more children and young adolescents (0 to 19 year olds) within the national population (23%) compared with the foreign population (20%). In contrast there are proportionately more in the age groups 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44 and 45-49 within the non-national population than the national population. The age group 20-49 accounted for 56% of the non-national population compared with 42% of nationals. In the age groups 50 years and over the situation is reversed and they account for a larger proportion of nationals than non-nationals. This is particularly noticeable in the population aged 65 and over which accounted for almost twice as many nationals (17%) as non-nationals (9%).

The relatively low average age of migrants reduces the average age of the total population although only marginally because the proportion of non-nationals in the population is relatively small in most EU countries. Moreover, the impact of migrants on the average age of the population is short-term and as the migrant population ages it will add to the older population age groups. Nevertheless, in net terms, migration flows add to the working-age population in the short-term and this is significant given that this age group was declining within the resident population in a number of EU countries.

Member states of the EU have traditionally adopted different policies in relation to the acquisition of citizenship. Of the countries listed in Table 9, most have adopted a more liberal approach to the acquisition of citizenship since 1990, with Germany showing the biggest increase in the rate of naturalisation, but some countries continue to have low levels of naturalisation. Thus Spain and Portugal had a much lower rate of naturalisation in 2003 than Germany, France and the UK. The rate of naturalisation is also low in Sweden yet Sweden is generally regarded as having a more liberal naturalisation policy than most other EU countries.

## **Labour Force Participation**

The size of the labour force in the EU15 has grown by about 10% since the mid-1990s to reach 178.8 million in the 4<sup>th</sup> quarter of 2004, while the corresponding figure for the EU25 reached 212.3 million (EC 2005a). In the 4<sup>th</sup> quarter 2004, 193 million people, representing 63.6% of the working population (15-64 years) in the EU25 were in employment. This was a slight increase on the previous year and was mainly due to an increase in the female employment rate, up by 1% to reach 56.1% in 2004. There was considerable variation across member states with Spain (+ 1.4 percentage points) and Slovenia (+1.6) recording the highest increases in female employment. Nevertheless, there is still a large gap in the activity (participation) and employment rates for men and women and there are considerable differences across the EU.

Notwithstanding the increase in employment that has occurred since the mid-1990s there are large variations in the employment and activity rates within the EU25. These indicators can be used to provide evidence of the inequalities and disadvantages that women and migrant workers sometimes face in the labour markets of EU member states. As a generalisation activity rates tend to be lower for women, third country migrants, older people and the low skilled.

In 2004 the average activity rates in the EU25 were 77.6% for men and 62.4% for women. For men the activity rate ranged between 70.4% in Poland to 83.7% in the Netherlands. Cyprus (82.9%), the UK (82.1%), Spain (80.5%), Germany (79.8%), Portugal (79.1%), Greece (79.0%) and Sweden (78.1) all had male activity rates above the EU25 average whereas Italy (75.2%), France (75.0%), and Slovenia (74.5%) along with Poland were below average. A different geographical pattern is revealed for women. Sweden (74.3%), the UK (68.7%), Portugal (67.7%), Germany (66.7%), Slovenia (64.3%) and France (64.0%) had female participation rates above the EU25 average whereas Cyprus (62.9%) was close to the average and Poland (58.0%), Spain (57.6%), Greece (54.3%) and Italy (51.3%) were below average. Only Poland and Italy have activity rates below the EU25 average for both men and women.

Activity rates vary with age and education. Taking the EU25 as a whole the activity rate is highest for both women and men in the 25 to 54 age-group and lowest for those aged 55 and over. Education has a positive effect on the activity rate and is more pronounced for women than men. Nevertheless, the gender gap in activity rates has persisted for many years, as has the gap between migrants and nationals. This is particularly important as the average activity rate for men is approaching a level that will be difficult to increase further. In the context of an ageing population, raising the economic activity rates of women and migrants assume major significance if sustained economic growth in the EU is to be realised. Achieving a higher activity rate for women also has implications for, among other things, the gender pay-gap and ways of reconciling work and family life.

The estimate by Eurostat on the gender pay gap indicates that it remained stable in the EU15 in 2003 at about 16% (EC 2005b). A separate estimate for the EU25 gave a slightly lower figure of 15% indicating that the gender pay gap within the new member states is on average lower than in the EU15. Other evidence indicates that the gender divisions within the labour market have changed very little and women remain highly concentrated in particular occupations and industrial sectors. For example, 31% of managers were women in 2003, a rise of 1% over 2002. In addition women experience greater poverty in later life and single parents, mainly women, experience cumulative disadvantage and are vulnerable to social exclusion (ibid.5). In general, migrant women experience these disparities and inequalities even more than national women. Third country migrant women are concentrated in low paid sectors and occupations. The evidence on pay indicates that migrant women experience the greatest inequality, earning on average 10% less than EU national women in 2000 (ibid.6). In contrast the male pay gap between EU nationals and third country nationals was 4%.

The share of non-nationals in total employment in the EU15 in 2003 was about 4% but they contributed 22% to employment growth between 1997 and 2002 (EC 2004a). Between 1997 and 2002 the growing demand for labour resulted in a rise in the employment rates of EU-nationals from 79% to 87.5% for the medium skilled and from 81.6% to 89% for the high skilled. Migrant labour also responded to the tight labour market conditions and provided most of the growth in employment over the period. The number of skilled migrant workers in the EU15 increased by 100% and the number of medium skilled increased by 50%, which was equivalent to more than 60% of the total increase in their employment. The growth of low skilled employment followed a similar although more moderate trend with non-nationals again providing most of the increase (ibid.).

The activity rate of the foreign-born population in 2002 (67.9%) was lower than the EU15 average (69.6%). Nevertheless, average figures tell us nothing about the labour market participation of particular sub-groups of foreign migrants. Moreover, the data on relative differences in activity rates have to be used carefully. Part of the problem is linked to the variation in the absolute levels of activity across member states. Activity rates tend to be lower in Southern Europe and higher in the UK and Nordic countries. Hence the relatively high activity rates of foreigners in Spain and the lower activity rates of foreigners in the UK

tells us little about the absolute levels of activity of foreigners in either country. There is a further complication because activity rates relate to the population of working age (15-64). As migrant workers may be over-represented in the working age population, the labour force activity rate for migrant workers as measured by the Labour Force Survey is higher than the real activity rate. These limitations notwithstanding we now turn to consider the evidence.

In general the activity and employment rates of third country migrants are below those of migrants from the EU which in turn are below those of nationals. The data show that activity rates were particularly low for migrants from Turkey, Africa and the Middle East and Asia. This pattern is more pronounced for women than men, moreover, while the average activity rate for women within the EU15 was 18% lower than for men the gender gap was over 21% for the foreign-born workforce and in the case of workers from Turkey, Africa and the Middle East and Asia the gender gap ranged between 26% and 29% (Munz 2004).

The employment rate of the foreign-born population was also lower and the unemployment rate higher than the average for the EU15 in 2002. In general third country migrants have lower activity and employment rates and a higher unemployment rate than migrants from industrialised countries, mainly the EU. Unemployment among third-country nationals has on average remained double the rate of EU-nationals in the majority of EU countries over the decade to 2002 (EC 2004a). The employment rate was particularly low once again for workers born in Turkey, Africa and the Middle East and Asia while unemployment was also higher for workers born in those countries but not including Asia (*ibid.*). In contrast, migrants from the Balkan countries tend to have employment rates equal to or higher than EU-nationals (*ibid.* 15). While the employment rate for women is lower on average than for men, the gender gap is slightly greater among the foreign-born population. In contrast, unemployment is lower on average for women than for men and this applies to both those born in the EU as well as the foreign-born. Part of the explanation for this is that women on average are less likely to be registered as unemployed and more likely to be categorised as inactive.

The foreign-born population includes some that may be nationals of an EU member state as well as those that have acquired citizenship. Hence it is also helpful to compare the activity, employment and unemployment rates of nationals and non-nationals. As will be revealed, the differences vary widely and in some cases are reversed. First, taking the population of working age, it is evident that the activity (participation) rates of women are considerably lower for non-nationals compared with nationals in the majority of OECD countries (see Table 10). The exceptions are Austria, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain. The unemployment rates of non-national women are also higher than nationals, apart from Slovakia and Spain, and the gap ranges between -2.4 percentage points (Slovakia) to +18.2% (Finland). In contrast to women, the differences in activity rates between non-national and national men are smaller and in the majority of countries considered in Table 9, the activity rate is higher for non-nationals (Austria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain). At first sight the activity rates may appear to indicate that non-national men are being integrated into the labour markets in many countries. However, the unemployment rates presented in Table 9 indicate that labour market integration is still a major issue for non-national men in many countries. With the exception of Italy, male unemployment is on average several percentage points higher for non-nationals compared with nationals and this is an indication of the extent of the labour market integration problem faced by male (and female) migrant workers.

The previous paragraph analysed the activity and unemployment rates of the working age population. The following paragraphs focus on the prime working-age population, that is those between 25-39 years of age as this age band accounts for the majority of migrant workers. In 2000 the activity rate of female non-nationals aged 25-39 residing in the EU was 54% compared with 76% of nationals. The employment rate was approximately 44% for female non-nationals compared with 68% for nationals. There are, however, considerable

differences between member states. For example the activity rate of non-national women in Portugal was over 90% compared with 82% for nationals whereas in the Netherlands the corresponding figures were 38% and 80%. The gap in the employment rate between non-nationals and nationals was on average wider for women than men, within all working age groups in 2002 (EC 2004). Unemployment rates in the EU15 averaged 9% for non-national women compared with less than 7% for national women (EC 2003).

For men the differences are less pronounced, with an average activity rate of 86% for non-nationals compared with 93% for nationals and average employment rates of 72% and 88% respectively. The employment rates of non-national men were markedly below the EU15 average in Ireland (46%), Sweden (50%), Denmark (52%) and Finland (60%) but significantly above in Greece (91%), Portugal (90%), Austria (86%) and Italy (85%). Unemployment rates of non-national men averaged 12% as against less than 6% for national men (ibid.).

Both within the EU15 countries and the 10 new member states migrant labour is increasingly used to plug skill shortages and to fill gaps in the demand for labour. This is only effective in so far as the migrant workers are incorporated into employment. The persistence of higher rates of unemployment among non-national migrants indicates the EU is not making full use of its migrant population and that certain groups of migrants are excluded from economic activity.

In the new member states only a small proportion of the migrant labour force is from the EU15 and such workers tend to be high skilled and employed on short-term contracts in managerial and professional positions. The vast majority of the migrant labour force within the new member states are from Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans and are mainly employed in manual jobs in textile and food production, construction and agriculture. Women are more likely to be employed as domestic helpers and carers for children or the elderly.

It is evident that within these migrant-dominated sectors migrants tend to be employed in positions of low skill, low status and low pay, often on temporary contracts, which offer limited job security. Whether such entry points into employment help to break the vicious circle of low skill and facilitate the sustained integration of migrants into the labour market is uncertain.

### **Migrant educational attainment**

Education can be both a strategy for social enhancement but also a determinant of employment status. However, there is a lack of comprehensive data on the educational attainment, skills and training of migrants and there have been few studies that have addressed the link between education and labour market position within the migrant community. The evidence available indicates that the lower average activity and employment rates of non-national men and women correlate with the lower levels of educational attainment of non-EU nationals residing in the EU15 in 2000. In addition, in 2002 more than 60% of third-country nationals in the 15-24 age group were low skilled compared with 46% for EU-nationals (EC 2004a: 14).

The education and skills that migrant groups bring with them vary greatly. Many migrant workers recruited for unskilled jobs in the period up to the 1970s (e.g. Turks) had low levels of formal education or training and later flows of those migrant groups had similar educational qualifications. Many ex Yugoslavs workers in Austria and Germany, Italian and Moroccan workers in Northern Europe and other more recent non-EU migrants to Southern Europe were also hired for jobs requiring lower secondary education or less. In contrast,

migrant workers taken on to fill high skill posts in health, in the UK and Ireland, or computing, in Germany, often have tertiary level education. The EUMC (2003:41) report refers to a polarisation in terms of the skills and education of migrants, who are disproportionately represented among the low skilled and low educated (mainly third country nationals) but also, in some countries, among the highly skilled and educated (mainly EU nationals). Recently arrived third-country migrants to the EU tend to have a higher skill level than longer term resident migrants, nevertheless they have lower activity rates and higher unemployment rates than their established counterparts. For example, the employment rate of third-country migrants who arrived in 2001 was almost 20 points below that of those who arrived in 1991 (EC 2004a:14)).

The lower educational attainment levels of non-nationals are particularly evident for those in the 25 to 39 age group and for women the differences are even more marked than for men (EC 2003a). Whereas approximately a quarter of national women had been educated at the tertiary level the figure for non-national women was only 17%. Similarly, more than 50% of non-national women had lower secondary education or below while the proportion in the case of national women was only 30%. There is little evidence of any relative improvement in the educational attainments of third-country nationals according to the European Commission's First Annual Report on Migration and Integration (EC 2004a:14).

The average educational attainments of non-national migrants in the EU15 conceals marked differences across member states. For example significantly more non-national women have attained tertiary level education in the UK, Sweden and Finland while proportionately more have lower secondary education or below in Portugal, the Netherlands and France. Overall within the EU15, women of non-EU nationality in the 25 to 39 age group with tertiary education are more likely to be employed than those with lower qualifications, nevertheless they are less likely to be employed than their national counterpart. While on average approximately 50% of non-national women aged 25 to 39 with tertiary level education were in employment in the EU15 the corresponding figure for nationals was 83%. Similarly for women with lower secondary education or below the employment rate for non-nationals was about a third compared with over a half for nationals. The differences in the employment rate for men are smaller but nevertheless on average non-national men have an employment rate which is approximately ten percentage points lower than that of nationals.

There is also evidence that some highly educated migrants find it difficult to obtain jobs that match their qualifications. This is particularly a problem for migrants that arrive without a job contract, for refugees and also for family members. A number of explanations for this have been suggested, including inadequate language proficiency (Mc Mahon 2002), formal non-recognition of qualifications and experience acquired abroad, and the devaluation of foreign qualifications by employers. In Sweden, the link between qualifications and occupation is different for second generation migrants compared with both their parents, who obtained their qualifications abroad, and also siblings born abroad. There are also variations between different migrant groups (Jonsson 2002). Nevertheless, the problem appears to be prevalent in many member states (EUMC 2003:42).

The statistical evidence considered here does not provide a sufficient basis for explaining the differences in the employment and unemployment rates between non-national and national men and women. Educational qualifications are often correlated with rates of employment but there are exceptions. In Portugal, non-national women are more likely to be educated at the lower secondary level yet the employment rate is very high and unemployment low. It cannot be assumed that the lower employment rate of non-nationals is due to an unwillingness to work. The low rate of employment of non-nationals may be related in part to their higher participation in education or training but the relatively high rate of unemployment of non-nationals also points to difficulties in gaining entry to jobs. Cultural differences may also be relevant in the case of women, as might the lack of or cost of childcare facilities or the

absence of supportive social or family networks. Nevertheless, it is difficult not to conclude that migrant women have made less progress in terms of realising their skills and labour market integration than their male counterparts (EC 2005c:6). Moreover, there is growing evidence that the failure of the EU to fully utilise the skilled labour potential among migrants (women and men) places them at a distinct disadvantage in terms of “income, wealth, social mobility, housing, training, participation in social life and a number of other dimensions” (EUMC 2003:28).

### **Migrant employment: sectors, industries and occupations**

When considering the labour market position of migrants within the EU it is important to differentiate between migrants from the EU and those from third countries. Migrants from the EU working in another EU country are more likely, although not always, to be employed in high income and status positions. In contrast non-EU nationals, as we have observed, are more likely to experience unemployment and, if they are in work, be employed in more vulnerable, low paid, low skilled jobs (EUMC 2003:35). Recent non-EU migrants are more likely to be employed in entry-level jobs in member states with regulated labour markets, or in informal sector activities in the less regulated markets of Southern Europe.

The migrants recruited as guest workers in the 1960s and 1970s were primarily employed in blue-collar jobs within the manufacturing sector. More recent migrants are employed across a range of industrial sectors. There are variations in the structure of migrant employment within the EU as is indicated in Table 11, but migrants from third countries are most commonly found in manufacturing and construction, within parts of the service sector, such as cleaning, catering, personal services and caring and in sectors subject to seasonal employment patterns such as agriculture and tourism.

EUMC (2003:36) refers to a hierarchy within the migrant labour market based on nationality, ethnicity, gender and legal status. In Portugal, Asian migrants often work in the commercial and service sectors, while Africans are mainly employed in low-skilled jobs in the industrial sector or construction (men) or cleaning services (women). In Italy, Black African migrants are over represented in factory work and street vending in Southern Italy; Filipino women as domestic servants; Moroccans and Albanians as bricklayers and labourers; and the Chinese as cooks and restaurant owners (ibid.). In Greece, Albanians are over represented in agriculture and construction, mainly in low skilled jobs; Poles and Romanians as skilled manual labourers; Asians as unskilled factory labourers; Africans as small traders and street vendors; and Filipinos as domestic workers (ibid.). In Sweden migrants are concentrated in a few industrial sectors. Those from third countries are most likely to be employed in the personal and cultural services sector, while migrants from EU/EEA countries are entrenched in manufacturing and recycling (ibid.37). In the UK, Black Caribbean men are concentrated in transport whereas Bangladeshi and Pakistani workers are employed or self-employed in the restaurant or textiles sectors. In contrast, Indian men are over represented in the medical profession.

Comparing migrant men and women it is noticeable that they are generally employed in different sectors and fill different roles in the labour market. Moreover, employment patterns are different for migrants compared with nationals. Table 12 shows that migrant women have accounted for a growing percentage of jobs in the household (domestic) services and health and social services sectors and, to a lesser extent, hotels and restaurants and education. In Greece for example 35.0 per cent of foreign women were employed in household services in 1994 compared with only 1.5 per cent for national women and ten years later the figures were

42.2 and 1.3 respectively. A similar trend is observed for Spain, Italy and France. Immigrant women working in the household services sector are often taken on to care for the young or the elderly but many are also employed as domestic helpers because of the increasing participation of national women in the labour market. In contrast, in the UK the proportion of both foreign and national women employed in the household services sector is much lower and moreover it declined between 1994 and 2004 (Oso and Garson 2005: 11).

The healthcare and social services sectors are major areas of employment for women generally in Europe and the proportion of both foreign and national women employed in these sectors increased between 1994 and 2004 for the countries shown in Table 11. In Denmark healthcare and social services are the main sectors of employment for women overall although while the share increased for national women between 1994 and 2004 it fell for migrant women. The UK has become heavily dependent on women, and particularly migrant women, in this sector with the proportion of employment rising from 21.0 per cent in 1994 to 25.0 per cent in 2004 for migrant women compared with 18.8 per cent and 20.6 per cent for national women (ibid. 12).

There are differences between countries in the importance of hotels and restaurants for the employment of women. Spain and Greece have the highest concentration of migrant women although in Spain the proportion fell between 1994 and 2004 while in Greece the proportion increased. A significant proportion of migrant women are employed in education in both Italy and the UK although the proportion in both cases fell between 1994 and 2004. In the UK the proportion of national women employed in education rose over the period. The retail trade also accounts for an important share of female employment, although less so in France compared with Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg and the UK. Nevertheless, this sector accounted for a declining share of migrant women's employment between 1994 and 2004 (ibid.13).

A rising proportion of migrants residing in the EU have turned to self-employment as their chosen means of livelihood. Ethnic businesses tend to be small on average and, as a rule, at least in the early stages of growth, are concentrated in certain sectors, including: catering; retail (especially groceries and newsagents) and wholesale trade; cleaning services; tourism; merchandise; and textiles and clothing manufacturing. Foreign nationals face specific difficulties in setting up a business but in a number of EU countries, migrants (or ethnic minorities) are now more likely to be in self-employment than nationals e.g. the UK and Sweden. There are differences in the levels of self-employment of different third country national groups. Self-employment is generally relatively high for Chinese, North African and some Asian migrants and lower for certain Black migrants. Migrant and ethnic minority women have lower levels of self-employment than their male counterparts.

### **Migrant incomes, wages and salaries**

There is a dearth of comparable data on the incomes of migrants. Moreover, when income data is collected it sometimes refers to the individual and at other times the household. This makes comparisons across the EU virtually impossible. Nevertheless, there is sufficient evidence to indicate that income differentials between nationals and different migrant groups are correlated with labour market segmentation and the terms of employment, although there is also evidence that migrant incomes are often affected by discrimination.

There are clear differences in incomes in the EU between nationals and migrants, and there are also variations between different migrant groups and in terms of gender. On average the incomes earned by third country migrants working in the EU are lower than EU-nationals. Evidence for Germany indicates that the proportion of foreign households with incomes below E 3,000 was four times that for German families (Germany, Statistisches Bundesamt

2001). In Sweden, there is evidence that income differential between nationals and migrants widened between the 1970s and 1990s from 3% to 14% (Swedish Government, 2002). In France, the average incomes of both male and female migrants are more than 10% lower than the overall average. Moreover, migrants are over represented in the lower percentile income groups and under represented in the upper percentile groups (Thave 2000). Gender differences in income are also pronounced. In the UK, there are income differentials based on gender and nationality but the differential between women of different backgrounds is on average smaller (TUC 2002). Moreover, migrant workers employed in the informal sector, such as domestic work, agriculture and food-processing, often receive pay below formal sector incomes.

## **Irregular migration**

The terminology used to refer to migrants who have not gone through the official migration channels or are involved in a variety of types of movement and status which are in conflict with migration laws in migrant receiving countries include 'illegal', 'clandestine', 'sans papiers' or 'undocumented', 'irregular' or 'unauthorised' etc. Each of these terms apply to a specific migration status but they are often used in the wrong context and confusingly applied to different sets of phenomena or vary in their meaning across national borders (Salt 2005). For example, the term 'illegal' is often applied to migrants without documentation or work permits, however this is often misleading because it conveys the idea of criminality, especially involvement with prohibited forms of work where this may not be the case. The terms 'unauthorised' and 'clandestine' may also be subject to the same criticisms (GCIM 2005). Furthermore these terms do not represent the full complexity of migrant legal status. It is widely acknowledged that migrants shift between the status of legality and illegality for various reasons, (including overstaying on tourist or student visas, work permits) which are often beyond their control or knowledge (Kofman 2003, Salt 2005). Thus the term "undocumented" is often considered more preferable because it is more neutral in relation to issues around legality, however it does not cover migrants like those discussed above who enter the destination country legally but later violate their original entry visa (UNRISD 2005). The term 'irregular' is perhaps the most useful term to encompass the complexity of such migration as it can be taken to describe the range of phenomena discussed above but also in addition those who are smuggled or trafficked across international borders, asylum seekers who fail to observe deportation orders and those who circumvent immigration controls through e.g. the arrangement of bogus marriages (GCIM 2005). The IOM uses 'irregular migration' to describe these migration phenomena and describes it as 'movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries' (IOM 2005b: 460). The term 'irregular' was adopted by 21 countries after the 1999 International Symposium on Migration in Bangkok. However there is still no broad consensus over the usage of terminology nationally and internationally. In this report we concentrate on certain aspects of irregular migration. In the first section we focus on those who are undocumented. In the latter stages we look at the phenomenon of trafficking and lastly on those who are employed in informal sectors, particularly domestic service and prostitution.

Composing a statistical picture on undocumented migration to Europe is a difficult task because by definition undocumented migrants do not identify themselves to the authorities and thus are not recorded in official statistics. Statistical estimates are the only way to attempt to establish the scale of such migration and these are generally arrived at by using existing indicators linked to the phenomenon, such as numbers of refused entries and removals, apprehensions of 'illegal' migrants at the border or in the country, rejected applications for

asylum or other forms of international protection, or applications for national regularization procedures (Salt 2005)<sup>2</sup>.

Estimates based on these sources are problematic and widely acknowledged for their lack of comprehensibility, reliability and comparability. Lack of transparency explains much of the unreliability of statistics for the following reasons: ‘guesstimate’ figures are seldom accompanied by detailed explanations of how they were derived; estimates of irregular migration are often conflated with data on asylum seekers, especially estimates on those who have been smuggled or trafficked (see Salt and Hogarth 2000); it is not clear how far yearly variations in official figures are variations in ‘real’ numbers or whether they simply reflect changes in detection (Salt and Hogarth, 2000); lastly it is often unclear whether official estimates include both those living and working illegally.

The second set of problems relate to the origin of statistics. For example, the political agenda behind the body providing the estimates results in different patterns depending on the source of data. Statistics on illegal migration are often police estimates which tend to be based on the numbers of deportations or regularisations but these seriously underestimate the total numbers of those in an illegal situation (Reyneri 2003). National authorities such as Border Police and various ministries collect data on the different types of irregular migration but their collection is at the discretion of individual states<sup>3</sup>. Regularisation programmes are also a source of data on irregular migrants. However, these programmes only cover some aspects of illegal migration and may target certain industries or sectors of the workforce and often demand certain requirements. Moreover, they occur infrequently and only in some countries therefore they have limited comparable purchase. In addition they do not account for those falling back into irregular status.

This links to the third set of problems which reflect the transitory nature of the phenomenon. For example, the statistics are not able to capture those exiting and re-entering destination countries, nor do they capture the complexity in changes of migrant legal status (especially of those frequently oscillating between legality and illegality). Lastly, in relation to the feminised aspect of irregular migration, statistical estimates are not easily disaggregated by gender and this is especially true of irregular migrant labour estimates. The most common way of estimating irregular female migration is through looking at domestic and service-sector jobs (including the sex-trade).

#### *Statistics on irregular migration*

Whilst there is a general consensus that the scale of irregular migration has increased, alongside the increase in the numbers of international migrants, the range of estimates still vary considerably<sup>4</sup>. For example, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimates that each year 500,000 undocumented migrants arrive in the EU (OECD 2003) whilst based on data for 2001 ICMPD estimate the total volume of illegal migration flow to Europe at 650,000 for the EU-15 and 800,000 for the (now) EU-25 (Jandl 2003). It is also common to see similar estimates used for different European regions, for

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<sup>2</sup> There are various ways of estimating illegal migrant presence: ‘residual’ (differences between census results and alien registers and municipal registers), ‘multiplier’ (projection of available indicators using an accepted defined multiplier; i.e. border apprehensions) ‘demographic’ estimates (looking for traces of such migrants in official statistics; i.e. the nationality of birth rates, death rates and hospitalization rates) and ‘indirect’ estimates (by linking the undocumented population to indicators such as the size of the grey economy, electricity consumption etc) (See Jandl 2003).

<sup>3</sup> European Commission’s Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on Immigration (CIREFI) collects standard datasets of data (such as the above) for individual European states. These statistics are presented as quarterly reports and are confidential and therefore not generally available (Salt, 2005)

<sup>4</sup> It is important to note that the range of countries in Europe covered by the statistics range from a focus on ‘Western Europe’, the EU (of which some statistics only include selected countries i.e. EU15, EU25 and others where there is data available) and others focus on the OECD countries.

example Papademetriou (Migration Policy Institute) estimated that 500,000 persons enter four traditional countries of immigration illegally every year (IOM 2003). It is for the reason of transparency that Widgren's 1993 estimate that there were between 250,000 and 300,000 is still the most widely accepted and quoted estimate of annual 'illegal' entries in to Western Europe because the assumptions upon which it was based are available (Widgren 1994).

There are also various wide-ranging estimates of the total level of migrants with irregular status in Europe. In 2000 The Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) estimated that at least 5 million of Europe's 56.1 million migrants had irregular status whilst in the late 1990s The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimated the overall level of 'unauthorized' migration in Western Europe was 3 million (IOM 2000) and OECD (2003) estimates that between 10-15 % of Europe's 56 million migrants have irregular status.

At the national level estimates can also vary considerably. For example, the number of 'unauthorized' migrants in France in the late 1990s was estimated to have been either 140,000 or 500,000 (Delaunay, 1998) and estimates of the number of irregular workers in Switzerland range from 70,000 to 180,000 (Piguet and Losa 2002). Thus it is often difficult to establish agreed estimates within nation-states let alone for the EU. Member states do not share a data collection system which permits simple aggregation or comparison. In Southern Europe, however, regularisation programmes have provided a rich fund of data on undocumented migration (see King and Zontini 2000).

#### *Trends and flows*

In the late 1990s there had been an increase in the movement of third country nationals bound for Western Europe through South East Europe. This region observed undocumented movement three times the rate of that coming via Mediterranean countries and twice the rate of those travelling through East and North Eastern Europe (Widgren 1999). In the early 2000s the main direction of flows within Europe still remains those from East and Southeast to Western Europe. However, border apprehension data collected by ICMPD shows the pattern of recorded undocumented migration flows no longer conforms to clear-cut migration routes, but has become more complex over the years blurring the more classical routes of undocumented migration (Futo et al. 2005). The research points to changes in laws, visa regulations and stricter enforcement measures for forcing undocumented migrants (and their facilitators) to respond by constantly developing new routes and ways often consisting of wide detours to reach their final destinations. Based on the contribution of national border services of 22 European Countries the same study shows that in the year 2002 the top 10 countries of origin of undocumented migrants to the EU 15 were largely Albania (12%), Romania (8%), Iraq (8%), Morocco (7%), Ukraine (5%), FRY (5%), Algeria (4%), China (3%) Turkey (3%) and Russia (2%). Whilst the top 10 countries of origin of undocumented migrants to 17 Central Eastern European (CEE) countries in 2003 were largely Georgia (13%), Moldova (8%), Russia (7%), Turkey (5%), Ukraine (5%), Pakistan (4%), Iraq (3%), China (3%), Afghanistan (3%) and Poland (2%) (ibid.).

However, there has been a decentralising tendency in this region. Whilst in 2001 5 countries (Iraq, Romania, Afghanistan, Moldova and Russia) accounted for 60% of all apprehensions to the region in 2003 the top 10 sending countries listed above only accounted for 49%, evidence of the trend noted previously about the blurring of 'classical' routes of migration. In addition to this there has been a sharp overall decrease in border apprehensions in the CEE region between 2001 -2003 (a reduction of 20% in 2003) which is thought to be due to higher border control standards across the region, visa-exemptions of Romanian and Bulgarian nationals entering the Schengen area, geopolitical factors in the middle east, and possibly new unknown strategies of human smugglers leaving many cases undetected. The research also shows that in 2003 one-fifth of apprehended undocumented migrants in CEE countries were female and this is believed to have increased in the last few years (Futo et al. 2005). Female undocumented migrants from the CEE are also believed to be increasingly travelling alone, in

search of a job compared to female migrants from Asian countries that largely travel with their families (ibid.). A larger proportion of undocumented migrants are also believed to use the help of organised human smugglers. For example, the Hungarian Border Guard noted a rise in assisted undocumented border crossings from 20-25% in the mid 1990s to 70% in more recent years.

The numbers of migrants regularized during national amnesty programmes are often agreed to provide the most solid baseline for estimating the scale of irregular populations (Kofman 2003). Estimates of the level of undocumented migration to southern Europe based on regularisation data in recent years indicate high levels of undocumented migration in southern European countries. An analysis of regularisations up to the beginning of 2000 suggested that the total number regularised in the programmes of Greece, France, Spain and Italy was 1.75 million (Apap and Schmitter 2000). Since then further amnesties in Southern Europe have resulted in several hundred thousand more applications: in Spain there were 670,000 applications for regularization in 2004-5 (the majority of which were from South Americans) (IOM 2005c), in Italy 700,000 applications were lodged during the first three months of its 2002 regularisation programme (Salt 2005), and in Greece 351,000 applications were made in 2001, the majority of which were by Albanians. A recent report by the European Parliament based on Eurostat estimations in 2006 concluded that regularisation programmes had increased the numbers of non-EU25 national populations in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain on average by 5 times between 1990 and 2004, whilst in most other European countries this figure had not changed significantly. Moreover, it claims that if such amnesties were taken across the EU there would be a hidden figure which would be much larger than those indicated by official statistics in countries like the UK and Germany.

There is not enough information provided to establish how many women applied for regularisation and this would in any case vary from country to country depending upon which aspect of undocumented immigration or which employment sector was being targeted. In Spain for example, the government's 2004 amnesty programme gave migrants the opportunity to legalize their status if they "were able to demonstrate an authentic labour relationship" (IOM 2005c)<sup>5</sup>. The 'authentic labour relationship' that is referred to here is somewhat ambiguous and it is likely that this could exclude a large number of irregular migrant women located predominantly in the domestic sector for which it may be more difficult to demonstrate an authentic labour relation. Moreover, they may risk losing their employment by jeopardizing their relationship with their employer (who may be unwilling to declare their workers, especially those in private households) in trying to do so (Kofman 2003). In addition, as noted by Lazaridis (2001) regularization for those migrants involved in prostitution would make their situation even more precarious. It is nevertheless generally the case that such regularisation amnesties often tend to regularise only those whose participation in the labour market is welcomed by the state and private sector (GCIM 2005). Thus if this is applied to the sectors normally occupied by female migrants (largely domestic service and prostitution in Southern Europe, see Kofman 2003) it would appear that these sectors are less likely to be targeted by national governments, and thus the numbers of women recorded in the regularisation amnesties would be an underestimate of the actual level of the irregular female migrant population. Of course, as mentioned previously, regularisation does not account for those who are undocumented residents but not working.

#### *Feminisation of irregular migration*

Female migration to Europe is estimated to account for 52.4% of all migration to Europe in 2000 (Zlotnik 2002). There has been an increasing recognition of the feminisation of global

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<sup>5</sup> It is important to note that here whilst regularization figures refer to the number of applications received figures published by governments can often refer either to the number of applications for, or the number of persons granted regular status as each country has its own individual system for collecting data. Some also count named dependants.

migration (Castles and Miller, 1993), which is increasingly moving towards autonomous female migration (Anthias 2000, Buijs 1993, Lutz 1997). Undocumented migrants are recognised as making up an increasingly important component of this migration especially in the largely illegal sex industry (Morokvasic 1993, Phizacklea 1998, Lutz 1997). Women are believed to constitute a large proportion of migrants with irregular status for the very reasons that they are confronted with gender-based discrimination, making it more difficult for them to gain regular status than it is for men (see Anderson and Rogaly 2005). Consequently migrant women are often obliged to work in sectors where work is easier to find i.e. in the informal domestic or sex-related sectors, which do not warrant the issuing of necessary visas or work permits. There are a number of reasons why women are migrating to work under these conditions, including changes in gender and sex-roles in sending and receiving countries (Campani 1999), the increased demand for female work in the informal domestic and sex related service sectors in western markets (Campani 1997), the wish of women to escape oppressive or violent environments or to transcend traditional gender constraints, or to create a better life (Kofman et al. 2002, Phizacklea 1998).

In addition to work in domestic service and the sex-trade it must be noted that women are increasingly entering as students some of whom remain in the country (not always legally) by marrying or finding employment. Student migrations are increasingly seen as a form of migration of qualified labour and this has meant that in many EU countries it has been made easier to switch from student to worker status (SOPEMI 2001)

## **Trafficking**

### *Defining the problem*

There is a degree of confusion surrounding the concept of trafficking in terms of its definition and in terms of understanding its complex nature. There are two different approaches to trafficking in persons. On the one hand it can be regarded as a human rights issue with a focus on the sexual exploitation and abuse suffered by trafficked women. On the other hand it can be seen as a migration issue with a focus on practical measures to combat exploitation (such as the promotion of the rights of sex-workers). There is on-going debate and lack of consensus over which approach is most useful for addressing the issue. The human rights approach has been criticised for focusing on the consequences of trafficking to the neglect of its causes (see Ucarer 2001). The migration approach has been criticised for limiting trafficking to an issue of immigration and minimising the focus on exploitation. The lack of consensus on key concepts in the debate about trafficking, prostitution, voluntariness, abuse, and coercion has complicated efforts to formulate an effective framework to address the phenomenon of trafficking.

Confusion over the definition of trafficking has been partly due to the lack of consensus on the issue which has made it virtually impossible to arrive at an internationally agreed definition on trafficking. It has only been recently with the Palermo Protocol 2000 <sup>6</sup> (Protocol

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<sup>6</sup> The UN the definition of trafficking is:

*'the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.*

*Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs (UN definition. Article 3, paragraph (a) of the [Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons.](#))*

to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children) which was introduced to supplement the UN convention against Transnational Organised Crime that things have started to change. However, national legislations are often not up to date with the new definition and therefore it will take some time for the situation to be improved. There are three important aspects of the definition of trafficking in persons: 1) the act(ion) of: recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons; 2) this must be done by means of: threat or use of force, coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or vulnerability, or giving payments or benefits to a person in control of the victim; 3) for the purpose of exploitation, which includes, at a minimum, exploiting the prostitution of others, other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or similar practices, and the removal of organs (UNODC 2006)

However, there is still confusion and misunderstanding, as the nature of trafficking itself is extremely complex. This has implications for the treatment of the phenomenon. Victims of trafficking are often treated as criminals rather than as an issue of human rights. Moreover, as nation states strengthen their immigration policies, victims of trafficking are often left even more vulnerable (Anderson & Rogaly 2005) as trafficking is still often confused with more voluntary forms of illegal migration and in particular the smuggling of migrants, which can be differentiated by the notion of consent and the coercive, deceptive or abusive actions of the trafficker (UN 2004).

It is however generally acknowledged that in practice it is often difficult to establish whether there were elements of deception and or coercion and whether these are sufficient to classify the situation as one of trafficking or more voluntary migration. Salt for example suggests that the two forms of migration are best thought of as 'a continuum with room for variation between the two extremes' (Salt 2000: 34). Another important distinction which is often overlooked between the two forms of migration is that trafficking involves ongoing exploitation of the victim, with the profits going to the trafficker, whereas with smuggling, for example, any relationship or contract between the smuggled and smuggler may end with the arrival of the migrant at the destination. Lastly, it is important to note that trafficked victims are not necessarily taken outside of national borders; they may be moved from one place to another within the same country, whereas smuggling is always international.

Another problematic aspect of trafficked persons is that they are often (mis)identified by national authorities as undocumented and illegal migrants. The problem then becomes a human rights issue as they are then often treated as criminals rather than victims of serious human rights abuses and are sent back to their countries of origin, where many risk reprisals and/or re-trafficking (Amnesty International 2004). Government initiatives typically focus on the criminal rather than human rights (Skeldon 2000). The issue of human rights also applies to the exploitative conditions under which victims of trafficking are often forced to work. An example of this is the case of the Morecambe Bay cockle pickers in the UK whose death exposed the exploitation they were subjected to. However there are further complications to the notion of trafficking. It is possible to be trafficked even though one might be 'legal' and working with state permission. Migrants with permits can still be subject to forced labour and illegal deductions (Anderson and Rogaly 2005). By focusing on immigration the concept of 'trafficking' diverts attention away from the question of how immigration status contributes to vulnerability and abusive employment relations. Thus immigration controls can be presented as a solution to human rights abuses. Anderson and Rogaly (2005) in their research for the TUC have thus proposed an approach to trafficking which focuses on the outcomes of forced labour rather than one which approaches the elimination of trafficking through legislation and increased border controls. It is increasingly being recognised that prevention of trafficking can only be undertaken by addressing the root causes to do with the improvement in the socio-economic status of the population in the country of origin.

The vulnerability of victims of trafficking is something that is also overlooked due to the neglect of the exploitative element of the definition of trafficking. Vulnerability factors that put migrant workers at risk of exploitation and forced labour include, dependency on recruiters (for information and access to migration channels) and immigration status and isolation (both physical and psychological) as identified by Anderson and Rogaly (2005). Each of these factors can lead to forced labour and exploitation by the employer or an agent to recruit or keep a migrant in indecent working conditions. Migrant workers may be heavily dependent on personal networks, employers, agencies and other third parties not only for employment, but for food, shelter, access to health care, information about their rights and so on. Moreover, as the TUC in the UK has identified, there is limited protection in British law for some categories of workers, in particular *agency workers*, and difficulties in enforcing those rights that do exist without exacerbating the situation for trafficked migrants in exploitative situations.

There is increasingly a growing acceptance that the main purpose of trafficking is to place persons in a situation where their labour can be exploited under conditions which often involves human rights abuses. Nevertheless, narrow conceptions of trafficking found especially in legalistic definitions have tended to link trafficking uniquely to the sex-trade. For example legislation in some countries has only related to trafficking for sexual exploitation (UNODC 2006). Another general perception in most destination countries is that trafficking relates only to women (and children) whilst men are 'smuggled' for labour exploitation. (Anderson & Rogaly 2005). The disagreement over the definition of the problem can also be seen in existing studies on trafficking issues between what GCIM (2005:16) calls those coming from a sexual violence perspective, which focuses on commercial sexual exploitation and results in a victim discourse, and those focusing largely on migration which tend to look at practical measures to combat exploitation such as the promotion of the rights of sex workers. This, like the other problems of definition mentioned above, has implications for the quantitative assessment of trafficking.

#### *Statistics on trafficking*

Data on trafficking can be sought from national authorities such as social, police, immigration and judiciary; administrative data on assisted victims; national and international NGO information on assisted cases and research samples. In practice the majority of estimates are based on national border apprehensions and international organisations which have built up their own databases based on information of cases they have assisted. International organisations tend to be regarded as the most reliable sources of trafficking data because they have been working in the area for longer and have better developed systems for recording them (GCIM 2005). Border apprehension data also provide a basis on which to form estimates however it is extremely difficult to distinguish cases of trafficking from cases of illegal immigration and the practice varies from country to country.

Quantifying the extent of trafficking is rendered extremely difficult due to the conceptual and definitional problems mentioned earlier coupled with the complex nature of trafficking itself. Although there is general consensus that trafficking is on the rise, Salt (2000) suggests that if we rely on trafficking data alone it is not possible to confirm whether this is the case or not because estimates are so wide-ranging and unreliable. Data on trafficking suffers from: difficulties in accessing victims; the reluctance of victims to report to the authorities; the range of players involved in the process of trafficking; the difficulty in distinguishing cases of trafficking/smuggling from other forms of exploitation; the lack of systematic exchange of information between agencies and countries; the lack of clarity over whether statistics refer only to individuals or instances of re-trafficking (Kelly 2002); the lack of established systems to monitor trafficking in most countries (Kelly 2002); the lack of access to data on detected cases hidden in prostitution and immigration offence files; and also the conflation of trafficking with prostitution. Nevertheless there are some generally accepted estimates on the phenomenon.

The most widely quoted estimate of the number of women trafficked (and smuggled) annually into the European Union and the more prosperous Central European countries is the Council of Europe estimate of 120,000 (Laczko and Gramegna 2003). This is understood to be a relatively conservative estimate and the Economic Commission for Europe states that this could conceivably be doubled (EC 2004a). The following sources illustrate the range of estimates of the number of women trafficked into Europe. The IOM suggested in 1998 that the figure was 300,000 for the EU 15, however a UNICEF report estimated 120,000 women and children are trafficked into the EU each year and notes this is mostly through the Balkans (Limanowska 2005), and a Swedish NGO Kvinnaforum estimated that 500,000 women are trafficked each year into the countries of Western Europe (IOM 2003). What is interesting here is that the estimated numbers of trafficked women to Europe are almost as high as some of the estimates for overall irregular migration.

### *Trends and flows*

Although the statistical evidence is not able to verify the trends in trafficking, existing qualitative research on trafficking indicates that women are increasingly using the services of traffickers to organise their migration whilst at the same time they are increasing their vulnerability to abuse and violence (Agustin 2006, GCIM 2005, Limanowska 2005).

Most research into trafficking has concentrated on two sectors: the domestic sphere (cleaning and care) and the globalization of the sex industry. It is estimated that 80% of those trafficked are involved in sex work (Kofman 2003). Western Europe is still one of the most important global migration destinations for the traffic in prostitution. However, over the last few years there has been a change in origin of these women with increasing numbers coming from Central and Eastern Europe, replacing women coming from Asia, Latin America and Africa (GCIM 2004). Whilst the flow of trafficking tends to be from poorer to richer countries (especially those with more developed sex industries), these patterns have become more complex. One of the outcomes of trafficking is the emergence or growth of sex industries in countries of both origin and transit (Kelly 2002). This is noticeable particularly within Central and South Eastern Europe. Trafficking in women and girls mainly for the sex industry in Western Europe (Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, Germany and UK) and the United States has been the most rapidly growing illicit activity over the past two decades. According to various estimates up to 80% of the women and girls trafficked from Central Eastern Europe and CIS countries to Western Europe are destined for the sex services market (EC 2004a).

Trafficked victims are believed to come largely from the poorer countries of the South Eastern Europe region (Moldova, Romania, Albania and Bulgaria), countries which are also large migration sources more generally (World Bank 2005). According to Europol the main source countries of victims who are trafficked to the EU for sexual exploitation include not only Moldova, Albania, Bulgaria and Romania but also the Russian Federation and Ukraine. The Europol study also identifies the main EU destination countries as Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and the UK (Europol 2006). IOM have also produced estimates of trafficking based on statistics produced by NGOs in Western European countries. According to this study in 1999 and 2000 women trafficked to western Europe largely originated from the Baltic and CIS (19.7%), Central Europe (5.8%), Balkans (20.8%), Africa (28%) and Other/Unknown (25.1%).

In more recent years traditional sending countries in Eastern Europe (especially Belarus, Lithuania, Russia, Ukraine and Moldova) have also become transit and destination countries. There is evidence of 'chain trafficking' and privileged links between countries, such as Lithuanians in Germany or Nigerians in Italy. In particular, the lack of economic opportunities and poverty play a major role (Kofman 2003).

The above trends have been more recently confirmed by a large scale research undertaken by the United Nations Organisation for Drugs and Crime (UNODC 2006). Firstly, there has been a change in the origin countries of women coming to western Europe<sup>7</sup> with women from Central and South Eastern European countries (CEE)<sup>8</sup> replacing those from Asia, Latin America and Africa. The research cites the following countries as being the most highly reported: Albania, Romania, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Poland and Hungary. Secondly, CEE countries are now no longer only sending trafficked women but have become more important receiving and transit countries as trafficking has increased from further eastern countries (i.e. Belarus, Russia, Lithuania, Ukraine and Moldova). Lastly, trafficking to parts of the Balkans has also grown to include flows from Moldova, Romania and Ukraine. The report also identifies that in both European regions adult women were reported as the majority of victims of trafficking (CEE: 53 out of 60 sources, WE: 66 out of 80 sources) and in Western Europe there was a substantial reporting of trafficking of girls (30 out of 80). Sexual exploitation is reported as the main cause of reported trafficking (CEE: 53 out of 60. WE: 67 out of 80) whilst trafficking for the purpose of forced labour was much lower (CEE: 10 out of 60. WE: 13 out of 80). The high frequency of sexual exploitation reported as the purpose of trafficking is raised by the UNODC as being due in part to the fact that the legislation in some countries has only related to trafficking for sexual exploitation (UNODC 2006)

According to the UNDP, research conducted in the South Eastern Europe (SEE) region appears to indicate that trafficking in the West Balkan region is declining rapidly. In contrast, although not based on verifiable data, there is a general consensus amongst practitioners working in the area that trafficking is not declining but due to changing patterns it has become more hidden and better organised. (Limanowska 2005). Trafficked women in the sex industry are largely illegal and undocumented (see the IOM, various years), whilst those who are not illegal entrants may be documented as cabaret artistes and musicians (as in the case of Cyprus, see Anthias 2000).

#### *The Profile of trafficked women and their conditions*

According to the ILO (2005) there is an obvious link between trafficking, women and racial discrimination. Women of certain racial or ethnic groups are subjected to abuses more than others, whilst at the same time trafficking itself involves racist attitudes and perceptions.

The IOM has also collected data from persons assisted in the IOM counter-trafficking programme between 1999 and 2005 (which seems to be the largest survey conducted to date, sample size of 2,792). The data is weighted toward the Balkans where collection first began and Moldova, Ukraine and Romania predominate as countries of origin. It is not more widely representative of Europe nor does it reflect the total population of trafficked persons in given nations. However, it gives a picture of the profile of trafficked persons in this region. The data reflect a largely young and unemployed victim profile with most of the victims under 24 years old (72%) or within the 18-24 age bracket (59%). Only half of the sample was employed at the time of recruitment although 57% claimed to have some work experience but 30% had no experience at all. Of those that were employed 70% claimed to be a private or public employee, 6.9 % were self-employed or employed by their families, 3 % were domestic workers, and 1.2% had worked in the sex industry prior to recruitment. 6.4 % had

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<sup>7</sup> 19 Western European countries include: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom

<sup>8</sup> 17 Central & South Eastern European countries include: Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Serbia & Montenegro, Kosovo (Serbia and Montenegro), Slovakia, Slovenia, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

had other occupations, while information about the nature of work was not available for 11.7 % of those 1,276 persons claiming to have worked at the time of recruitment. The report also found that the victims tended to be on low salaries (45% earning less than USD 50 per month) or under-employed in their country of origin. Those with children (29.2% of victims) were generally the sole household wage earner (80.4 %) and often single mothers supporting children without a spouse.

A significant proportion of traffickers were women. They were mostly ‘strangers’ (60%), or friends (30%), (but 30% of all cases data was not supplied). The majority of victims trafficked were exploited for sex work (75%) and only 7% through other forms of forced labour, while 17% was not known or marked as ‘other’ (IOM 2005b).

### **Women in informal employment: Prostitution and Domestic services**

The possibilities and opportunities available to migrant women for finding employment are limited to the types of work open to them which tend to be mainly typical female jobs: domestic service, casual employment, the leisure industry, the sex industry and especially prostitution. Globally, most women migrants generate income through jobs which are considered unskilled, are poorly paid and often performed in the domestic/private domain or related to the expansion of the service industry. They are jobs that tend to be looked down upon socially and devalued economically (GCIM 2005:5). Many migrants, including those who hold legal status, are only able to find unregulated (underground) jobs (Reyneri, 2003) and the feminisation of labour migration has led to the informalisation of many sectors (Chaib 2003). Those with irregular status are often obliged to accept the most menial informal sector jobs with degrading working conditions, limited prospects, and limited physical safety and financial security. Working in the informal sector often reduces migrant women’s access to information networks and social support is limited, exposing them to discrimination, abuse and violence. Whilst regular female migrants may also end up in the informal sector, irregular female migrants are often maintained in a situation of slavery and dependence on third parties due to their precarious situation and risk of abuse (See Anderson and Rogaly 2005).

It has been argued that in Southern Europe the role of the informal economy has been fundamental in conditioning the types and outcomes of immigration into Southern Europe, (King and Zontini 2000). Whilst it is not possible to target immigrants as the ‘cause’ of the existence of undocumented economic activities, nevertheless, immigrants have interacted with the black economy in a very dynamic way, causing it to expand and reshape itself in many new directions.

According to the EC (2004b), ‘once in the EU many illegal migrants are able to find work in the hidden economy, demonstrating that there is a clear link between illegal migrants and the unregulated labour market’. Within the EU, the shadow economy is estimated to be between 7-16% of EU GDP (ibid.) although this is by no means entirely made up of illegal migrants. Illegal migrants work mostly in the low-skilled sector such as in construction, agriculture, catering or cleaning and housekeeping services to support themselves.

### **Prostitution**

There are a number of problems with the concept of prostitution which relates to the exploitation of women. But like the concept of trafficking there are two different approaches which seek to address the issue from irreconcilable positions.

One of the main debates about prostitution is over the issue of ‘forced’ versus ‘voluntary’ prostitution. The two opposing views relate to whether a person can ‘choose’ prostitution as a

profession or not. The abolitionist perspective, inspired by feminist thought regards the issue of choice as irrelevant to the debate; it views women's bodies as 'the site of women's oppression' and regards the use of female bodies for sex by men an issue of power not sex. All prostitution is thus viewed as sexual exploitation which can be compared to sexual violence such as rape and incest (see Barry 1996 and Raymond 1998). The second debate developed by the sex-workers rights movement, differentiates between the forced position: women who are trafficked and coerced by a third party to enter the sex industry (e.g. by traffickers) and the voluntary position: women who chose to enter into the sex industry with full knowledge that they are entering into prostitution. This position respects women's autonomy to use their own bodies as a source of income (Doezema 2000).

Whilst concentrating on the suffering and victimisation of women by campaigning against transnational trafficking, the abolitionists have been criticized for neglecting the need to address sex workers' rights to economic, social and legal safeguards and decent labour conditions (Gulcur and Ilkkaracan 2002). On the other hand upholding sex-workers' rights and using the term 'sex work' has created much controversy by implying that the selling of sexual services should be considered labour like any other (see Bindman & Doezema 1997 and Raymond 1998). Thus Gulcur and Ilkkaracan (2002) argue that the debate should not focus on the forced/ voluntary debates on sex-work but rather focus on the need to 'ameliorate migrant women's living and working conditions by addressing restrictive and abusive immigration policies and by decriminalizing undocumented sex work' (ibid.1)

This takes us on to the next issue which relates to the debate over the terms prostitution and sex-worker. Whilst the term sex-work(er) has been criticised by abolitionists in relation to the acceptance of the sex industry as a legitimate economic practice, 'prostitution' has been problematic from a migration studies point of view because its wording has been regarded as too outdated and restrictive in terms of its current state of the global commercial sex industry. Agustin for example sees it as too narrow and stigmatising to women working in the sex-trade. She views the sex sector as a 'vast, high-income operation worldwide, [which includes] a wide array of businesses selling sex, many of which cannot by any stretch of the imagination be called 'prostitution', and all open to migrants' (Agustin 2006: 2). Furthermore, she argues that the term 'prostitution' puts restrictions on the inclusion of migrants who sell sex within the field of migration studies because the term victimises these women and as a consequence they are more likely to appear in criminology or feminist theory where they tend to be called victims (ibid.).

In addition, the difference between prostitution and trafficking is not always easy to perceive because of the informal character of the contract between the intending migrant and the trafficker and the impossibility of checking the extent to which the victim was aware of the nature of the work that she would be undertaking. It is important to note here though that even where a migrant might be aware that she would be working as a prostitute, this could still be considered trafficking if activities are undertaken to restrain freedom of movement i.e. through the confiscation of passport, physical abuse, treatment as a commodity and very poor rates of pay.

#### *Conditions*

The underground nature of the sex industry is often combined with restrictions on illegal/undocumented immigration in receiving countries which lead to working and living conditions for women that facilitate health risks, violence and harassment, police bribery, detention and arbitrary deportation (Gulcur and Ilkkaracan 2002). Moreover, illegal and undocumented migrant sex workers tend to be exploited by a range of agents: business owners, clients who refuse to pay them because they know they have no power to pursue the payment, and corrupt officials.

### *Statistics*

According to the Economic Commission for Europe (2004:14) there were an estimated 513,800 workers in the sex services market in Europe in total and 253,300 of these are migrants<sup>9</sup>. Nevertheless, these figures may underestimate the real size of the sex industry. For example, the European Union estimated in 2000 that between 200,000 and 500,000 people are working illegally as sex workers within the European Union (Ucarer, 2001), and 80% of prostitutes in Europe are immigrants (Dallas Morning News 1997). The IOM estimates that 300,000 or so prostitutes come from East European countries. In the year 2000 Transcrime reports (largely based on police reports) estimated the number of women and children trafficked for sexual exploitation ranged from a minimum of 44,000 to a maximum of 88,000 in 11 countries selected for the study (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, The Netherlands, Poland, Spain and Sweden). In 2002 this estimate had increased to a minimum of 50,000 and a maximum of 100,000 and according to the report the trend is on the rise for subsequent years. (Transcrime 2005)

The 2004 the Trafficking in Persons Report by the State Department in the United States estimated that the annual supply of women from Eastern, Central European and CIS countries to the sex industry of Western Europe has been between 120,000 and 175,000 since 1989. In contrast, some European estimates suggest that, in 1990-1998, more than 253,000 women and girls were trafficked into the sex industry of the 12 EU countries (Europap/Tampep 1999).

Tampep (2000) looks at the national origins of migrant sex-workers in a number of countries. In Italy, 54% are from Africa, 30% Eastern/South Eastern Europe, 16% Latin America; in Spain 65% Africa, 25% Latin America, 10% other; in Greece 47% Balkan States, 46% Eastern Europe, 5% Africa and Latin America, 2% Asia: whilst in the UK and France there are 32 nationalities mentioned. Campani (1999) estimated that there are between 18,800 and 25,100 foreign prostitutes and sex-trade workers in Italy. (King and Zontini 2000). The most common nationalities of prostitutes are Nigerians and Albanians, followed by Latin Americans and other Eastern/South Eastern Europeans.

### *Trends*

According to Caldwell et al. (1999), during the early 1990s the phenomenon of women being tricked and trafficked was higher than in the mid-1990s. Moreover, they argue that in the more recent years women (especially older women) were increasingly using their own resources to initiate free enterprise to work independently. According to Gulcur and Ilkharacan (2002) women from the former Soviet Union may chose a high-risk job like sex-work because it can provide social economic advantages such as the freedom to control their own resources. Also the research suggests that although they are vulnerable to violence and discrimination some migrant sex workers are 'paradoxically in control of their bodies' and create their own 'survival mechanisms in a patriarchal world by using such ideologies to their economic advantage'. Some sex workers, for example, refer to higher levels of pay and flexibility (for trips home and child care) as compared to 'legitimate' work (Gulcur and Ilkharacan 2002: 418).

## **Domestic work**

Domestic labour has often been considered as requiring soft skills transferred from the home, and therefore less likely to qualify for work permits (Kofman 2003). Thus this sector is one that is taken up by migrant women and especially those who enter the country without the necessary documentation. In all countries of the European Union domestic work performed

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<sup>9</sup> This statistic was gained through looking at 12 countries Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden and United Kingdom

by migrant women is increasing (Schwenken 2005). Until recently the growth of employment for migrant women was driven by the informalisation of the service sectors and inadequacies of welfare provision. Women migrants are prominent in several of the 3D jobs – dirty, degrading and dangerous (domestic, textiles, hotel and catering, agriculture, see Bell 2002). According to the Economic Commission for Europe (2004: 8) about 4 million women are trafficked into domestic labour every year.

According to a report compiled by the ETUC (2005), although the data does not show the full extent of domestic work in Europe, there is evidence that there is a growing gap between the demand for and supply of domestic labour. In Germany for example, there were vacancies for an estimated 200,000 jobs in personal services, and there are nearly 500,000 jobs in community services in France (ETUC 2005). Within this sector undeclared work is believed to be widespread. Some sources estimate that 70-80% of jobs in the sector are undeclared if not more (ETUC 2005). For example the report claims that the number of undeclared employees in Austrian households is estimated to be up to 300,000, whereas only 5,000 are registered with the authorities. In addition a study in 1997 showed that in France there were five undeclared workers for every declared worker in household services and in Italy the estimate was as high as three undeclared workers for every declared worker. The trend for the domestic service sector is believed to be at its largest in Southern Europe. Moreover, in Southern Europe the domestic service sector is the main source of employment for migrant women (Kofman 2003). According to the ILO, in France and Italy, over 50% of migrant women are believed to be engaged in domestic work (ILO 2003:11), and in Spain domestic service is the main and almost obligatory gateway for 63% of non-Community foreign women (GCIM 2005: 5).

The domestic sector varies from country to country in terms of its **structure** and regulations. Whilst Southern European countries recognise the domestic sector as an area of employment, for example Spain establishes an annual quota (King and Zontini 2000) and Italy specifically allows for the regularisation of domestic workers<sup>10</sup> (Fasano and Zucchini 2002), some Northern countries are more restrictive. For example, Germany only allows citizens of specific countries from Central and Eastern Europe to legally work in the domestic sector for household help in families with a person in need of care. However Au pairs from Eastern Europe have become a form of hidden domestic labour which has enabled them to build up contacts and overstay as undocumented domestic workers. By comparison, in France domestic employment is more regulated by the state and still often done by established migrants such as the Portuguese and the Spanish.

The majority of the literature and research on domestic work within the EU-15 countries indicates that increasingly the domestic workers in these countries are from the 10 new accession countries. However, there is also an increasing need for household services and the provision of care in the new member states which is encouraging the influx of domestic workers from Eastern European countries such as Ukrainian workers in Poland and Byelorussians in Lithuania (ETUC 2005). In some of the EU-15, particularly the Nordic countries, the welfare state is still the main provider of care for children, the elderly, the sick and disabled, and the workers so employed have recognised work and working conditions. In many countries, however, public provision has been severely cut back, and household services is another sector that has been taken over by private enterprise. In some, such as Denmark, it has been promoted as a way of generating micro- and small enterprises.

Many EU governments promote the sector as a way of mopping up unemployment, particularly of ‘low skilled’ women. Such schemes include the ‘Mini-Job’ scheme in Germany. While a lot of domestic work is now provided by private service agencies, there are

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<sup>10</sup> according to a legislation in 2002 for those who were seen to be less threatening and of strategic importance for the Italian economy

also millions of domestic workers who find their own employment in one-to-one arrangements with individual households (which may enslave them more as their rights go into the hands of individual employers). Some governments are attempting to regularise such privatised arrangements. For example, in Belgium and France there are 'service voucher' systems. In three municipalities in the province of Cataluña, Spain, there is an interesting new project that brings together local authorities, trade unions, domestic workers' associations, employers, university researchers, and women's groups. They are testing out new ways to regularise and professionalise household services.

Although patterns of employment, especially the presence of live-in-domestics, are different between Southern and Northern countries, there are also common issues and problems relating to the nature of the work. The most widespread problems with domestic work are widely acknowledged (Anderson 2000; Mate and Schepers 2000; ILO 2004; Schwenken 2005). They include the low pay and long working hours, between 15-18 hours a day (Economic Commission for Europe 2004:8), the inferior position of domestic workers and the highly personalized relationships with employers. Sometimes undocumented migrant workers receive no payment at all when the employer exploits their vulnerable situation, they are often requested to do additional work for employers' friends or relatives with no additional payment (Schwenken 2005). These conditions often amount to domestic slavery and those trafficked for domestic labour can additionally be required to grant sexual favours to their employers (Anderson and Rogaly 2005), especially because of their vulnerable situations.

In the UK, research organised by Kalayaan, the organisation for domestic workers in the UK, recorded the experiences of 755 workers between 1992 and 1996. The average they worked each day was 17.2 hours. 87.5% said they experienced Psychological Abuse (name calling, constant shouting, insults), 39.5 % experienced Physical Abuse (hitting, spitting, beating etc. by a member of the household), 11.7% Sexual Assault or Rape (including actual, attempted and threatened) 38.4% reported receiving No regular Food (given leftovers, or otherwise regularly denied food), 47.1 % Not having a Bedroom (forced to sleep in a hallway, kitchen or storeroom). 56.6 % Not having a Bed, 39.1 % experienced Imprisonment (denied permission to leave household or only with chaperon), 62.8% had their Passport confiscated by employer (not obtainable on departure), 55.8 % Not paid regularly, 58.29% Paid less than agreed in contract, 89.5% were denied time off from duties The average number of hours worked in a day was 17,07 and the average monthly salary (in US\$) was approximately 172,37 (Kalayaan 1996).

## **Summary**

This report has attempted to provide a statistical analysis of the level and pattern female migration in the EU and the subsequent integration of female migrants into the labour markets of member states. The available supply of statistical data has made this task more difficult than might have been expected. Comparisons between member states and aggregation across the EU are often made difficult because of the different definitions and categories of migrants and minorities that are employed by member countries. In addition, the definitions sometimes fail to capture the diversity within countries. There have been moves towards the harmonisation of statistical data within the EU but this has been partial. Moreover, until recently international migration data was not classified by gender and the official statistics mainly cover legal or regular migration.

Notwithstanding these difficulties the number of foreign-born migrants in the EU25 is estimated between 34 and 37 million in 2004 equivalent to 8 per cent of a total population of 456 million. Of the foreign-born, 25 million were estimated to be non-nationals in 2004 equivalent to 5.5 per cent of the EU population. The estimates reveal that women make up

slightly more than half of the migrant stock in the EU25. Germany, with 7.3 million has the largest foreign population but other countries with large foreign populations are France with 3.3 million, Spain with 2.8 million, the UK with 2.8 million and Italy with 2.0 million. Almost a third of the foreign population in member states are EU nationals. The remaining two-thirds are third-country nationals and this proportion has risen for most member states since the mid-1990s.

Net migration averaged 0.17 per cent of the EU25 population annually between 1992 and 2000 and has since risen to 0.29 per cent (1.311 million) in 2001, 0.46 per cent (1.981 million) in 2003 and then fell to 0.37 per cent (1.691 million) in 2005. In absolute numbers Spain (652,300), Italy (338,100), UK (196,300) and Germany (98,500) accounted for about three-quarters of the net inflow into the EU25 in 2005. In recent years the highest rates of net migration in relation to the resident population have occurred in Southern Europe. In 2005 it reached 2.72 per cent of the population in Cyprus, 1.5 per cent in Spain and 0.58 per cent in Italy compared with 0.33 per cent in UK, 0.17 per cent in France, 0.12 per cent in Germany and -0.03 per cent in Poland. Women account for approximately 45 per cent of net migrants although if Germany is excluded the average is near to 50 per cent. Net migration accounts for about 80 per cent of population growth in EU15 since the mid-1990s.

Overall for the last decade, labour force participation and employment rates within the EU15 have been lower for women, third-country nationals, the low skilled and older workers. On average, third-country women have lower labour force participation and employment rates than both national women and their male counterparts although this is more likely in Northern Europe while Italy, Greece and Spain go against the trend. Although there are gaps in the data, and some exceptions, for example Cyprus and Slovenia, the unemployment rates of non-national women (and men) are generally higher than their national or EU counterparts.

Migrants are concentrated in particular segments of the labour market. Nevertheless, there is a demarcation between EU and third-country nationals along national, ethnic and gender lines and legal status. The majority of third-country nationals are employed in vulnerable, low-skilled, low-paid jobs in medium and low segments. Many third-country female migrants in Southern Europe are employed in domestic work although they are also found in manufacturing, cleaning, the sex industry and seasonal activities such as tourism and agriculture. The pattern of employment is different in the UK where migrant women are more likely to be employed in health care, education services, catering, food processing, the leisure industry and commercial cleaning and less so in domestic work.

There is a dearth of comparable data on the incomes of migrants but the available statistics indicate marked differences between EU-nationals and foreigners. Incomes are highly correlated with occupation, sector, length of stay and legal status and this adversely affects many third-country nationals. There are sharp differences in pay between men and women which can be explained in part by women's disproportionate representation in low pay sectors, such as cleaning and domestic work, the casual or part-time nature of many female jobs and their concentration in the informal sector.

There is also a sharp demarcation in working conditions between EU and third-country nationals. Third-country nationals often take jobs that EU-nationals prefer not to do. Many are employed in jobs that are insecure, have low job protection, low status, are short-term, temporary or part-time, dangerous and/or dirty and/or involve long irregular hours. Conditions are typically worse in the informal sector where many migrant women are employed.

There is a growing body of evidence to indicate that irregular migration involves considerable numbers with estimates for Europe ranging between 5 and 7.5 million in 2000. There is not enough information to know the number of females within irregular migration but many

female irregular migrants from CEE are believed to be increasingly travelling alone (Futo et al. 2005). Moreover, there is evidence that the pattern and routes of irregular migration have become more complex involving new routes and new ways (Jandl 2003).

Trafficking has emerged as a serious and complex problem with women and children being the main victims. By its nature it is under-reported and often difficult to track. Women are often trapped and exploited and vulnerable to abuse and violence. Trafficking is not confined to forced prostitution and may include bonded domestic work, care work and employment in sweatshops. Nevertheless, it is estimated that between 75 and 80 per cent of the estimated 120,000-700,000 persons trafficked into Western Europe each year are involved in sex work. After the collapse of the USSR trafficking was no longer confined to women from developing countries and since then the trafficking of women from the poorer CEE and SEE countries has increased. The main destination countries for trafficked women include France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain and the UK (Europol 2006).

Many of the new migrants to the EU work in the informal sector. The informal sector has been particularly widespread in Southern Europe for a number of years but it is also increasing in other EU countries. The main sectors for informal employment are agriculture, construction, tourism and domestic services. Many irregular migrants and asylum seekers work in the informal sector and some activities may be illegal and some criminal, such as drug trafficking and trafficking in women. Migrant women from third-countries have limited job opportunities in the EU country of destination. The jobs open to them are mainly typical female jobs in domestic service, the leisure industry and the sex industry and more often than not they are in the informal sector. Female occupations are generally regarded as unskilled and poorly paid and this is even more so in informal employment. Irregular female migrants have even less choice and are forced to find work in the unregulated labour market.

In Southern Europe domestic work has in the recent past been largely filled by migrant women from third countries although the literature indicates that increasingly domestic workers are from the 10 new accession countries. This work requires “soft” skills and with some exceptions, for example Cyprus, is less likely to qualify for work permits. Hence this work is largely taken up by migrant women without documentation and 70-80 per cent may be undeclared (ETUC 2005). It has been estimated that about 4 million women are trafficked into domestic labour each year (Economic Commission for Europe 2004). The trend for domestic labour is at its largest in Southern Europe. In Spain 63 per cent of migrant women are in domestic service (GCIM 2005) and in France and Italy it is over 50 per cent (ILO 2003). In the UK, where domestic work within private households is more regulated and hence less common, au pairs from Eastern Europe have become a form of hidden domestic labour.

The concept of prostitution is discussed extensively in the literature. The precise figures for prostitutes are unknown but recent estimates indicate that the number of workers in the sex industry in the EU may be far in excess of 500,000 and as many as 80% may be migrants. The underground, and in some cases illegal, nature of the sex industry in the EU, along with the way that irregular migrants are treated within the legal system, has adverse effects on the working and living conditions for women involved in prostitution. Not only do they face health risks but many are also likely to experience violence and harassment, police bribery, detention and deportation. In addition, illegal and undocumented migrant sex workers are often powerless to prevent exploitation by agents, business owners and clients.

In conclusion, female migrants are highly differentiated in terms of their migration experience and integration into the labour markets of the EU. The evidence has revealed that the migration experience is influenced by many factors including, the country of origin and destination; the education and skills of the migrant; legal status; the immigration and labour market policies of the recipient country; whether trafficked; and the occupation and sector

they work in and whether it is regulated. Many migrant women in domestic work and the sex industry face multiple disadvantages: they may have irregular status, may have been trafficked and are likely to work under unregulated conditions. While the migration experience may open up opportunities for economic advantage and increased autonomy, in some cases it may also result in low pay, exploitative working conditions and vulnerability or worse.

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## **Appendix 1: Country Briefs**

### **Cyprus**

Net migration has been positive since 1983 and reached 2.7%, the highest within the EU25, in 2005. According to the census of 2001 there were 32,117 non-EU nationals (almost 5% of the population) and 32,693 EU25 nationals resident in the Republic of Cyprus. Women account for approximately half of all immigrants in the period since the mid-1980s. In 2003 almost 12% of immigrants were returning nationals, a lower figure than in previous years, and over 53% of foreign migrants were citizens of EU15, mainly from Greece and the UK. Immigrants from Eastern Europe accounted for 18% of all immigrants and a further 18% of migrants were Asian. Migrants from Russia accounted for almost 10% of all immigrants and this was the largest group of third country nationals in 2003. 78% of Russians entered Cyprus for employment reasons. Asian migrants came mainly from Sri Lanka, Philippines, China and India. Migrants from the Philippines and Sri Lanka enter exclusively for work and most of them are women (88%) and are employed as domestic servants. In contrast, 89% of Chinese immigrants enter for study or training.

While migrants from Asia and Eastern Europe enter Cyprus primarily for employment or business reasons or for study, many EU15 nationals, mainly from the UK, many of whom are pensioners, and returning Cypriots intend to become permanent residents. The majority of Greek migrants are Russian-Greeks or Pontians and over two-thirds of them enter Cyprus for employment purposes. Overall, in 2003, 55% of long-term migrants came for employment; 10% for study or training; and 31% for permanent settlement. Migrants entering on a student visa are not allowed to work and as a result many subsequently apply for asylum in order to obtain a work permit.

Since April 2003, when the border between the north and south was opened, several thousand Turkish Cypriot workers daily have been entering the south for employment. These cross-border 'migrants' are not included in the migration statistics. The number of official foreign workers increased by one third between 2001 and 2003 and were mainly employed in Private Households (30%); Hotels and Restaurants (19%); Wholesale and Retail (11%); Agriculture and Forestry (9%); Construction (8%); Manufacturing (8%); and Other (15%).

Unemployment is low in Cyprus (3.5% at the end of 2003). In general, migrant workers are employed in manual, unskilled, low-paid and low-status jobs. Migrants are often forced into conditions of isolation and many, such as domestic workers, are restricted in terms of the sectors where they can work. Migrants entering Cyprus on a work permit are rarely allowed to stay long enough to acquire citizenship. This may partly explain why there is systematic discrimination against immigrants and only a limited attempt to integrate them into the country's labour market and social life (Trimikliniotis 2003).

### **France**

Immigration to France has followed an upward trend since 1997 after declining in 1994 and 1995. In 2002 206,000 foreigners were admitted for legal residence an increase of 62% over the figure for 1997 (Thierry 2004). The special regularisation programme in 1997-98 resulted in an increase of 46% in the number of admissions between 1996 and 1998. Immigration flows grew at a rate of 10.5% in 2000, 13.9% in 2001 and 12.6% in 2002. France's net migration rate increased from 0.9 per thousand in 2003 to 1.7 in 2005. The official figures almost certainly underestimate the full level of inward migration as they exclude irregular migrants in addition to many EU citizens that are not required to register. The number of asylum seekers rose to 58,550 in 2004 a 38% increase since 2000.

Most of the increase in immigration is made up of third-country nationals and year on year the proportion has been rising. Nationals from African countries accounted for 46% of total admissions in 2002, up from 37% in 1999, citizens of other EU states for 33% and Asians a further 12%. Nationals of the Maghreb countries accounted for two-thirds of African immigration in 2002 and Algeria (28,000) and Morocco (26,000) were the main countries of origin. Immigration flows from the Maghreb and Asia are the most dynamic, having grown by 20% a year between 2000 and 2002. Nationals from China and Tunisia have in particular shown remarkable growth since 1999.

Over the period 1999-2001 there were 102 female immigrants for every 100 male immigrants although the ratio has declined since the mid-1990s indicating that the frequently cited feminization of immigration is reversible. In excess of 55,000 migrants entered France for study purposes in 2002, a rise of 92% since 1999 and representing 27% of all immigrants. Moreover, students from third countries accounted for 48,000 (87%) of all immigrant students. Less than 30,000 of foreigners came to France in 2001 for employment purposes although this does not include seasonal or temporary workers or indirect entries to the labour market. The largest category of immigrants, 84,000 (41%) entered for family-related reasons although this was a higher proportion than in previous years.

There is high structural unemployment in France which has affected the young generally and among them young third country migrants. Among young people of North African origin, mainly born in France and many with tertiary level education, unemployment is approximately twice as high as nationals. Almost one third of migrants from North Africa and Turkey are unemployed whereas EU migrants are more likely to have a job than nationals. The situation is particularly bad for third country migrant women who find it very difficult to obtain employment. Many of them drop out of the labour force and this is reflected in their low activity rates.

## **Germany**

The number of non-nationals living in Germany increased from about half a million in 1950 to just over 7.3 million at the end of December 2003 representing 8.9% of the total population. Non-nationals include migrants and children born to migrants living in Germany. Just over 20% of non-nationals living in Germany in 2003 were born in Germany. In the period from the 1950s to the early 1970s most immigrants were guest workers, mainly from Turkey and Southern Europe. Since the 1970s immigrants have become more diversified. Almost one third of non-nationals residing in Germany are nationals of other member states within the EU25. The largest groups of non-nationals in descending order are Turkish citizens (1.877 million, 25.6% of all non-nationals with 35% born in Germany); Italians (0.601 million, 8.2%, 29%); Serbs and Montenegrans (0.568 million, 7.7%, 20%); Greeks (0.355 million, 4.8%, 27%); and Poles (0.327 million, 4.5%, 5%). The Nationality Act of 2000 introduced new regulations on citizenship for the children of non-nationals. Of the 76,200 children born to non-nationals in 2003, 48% were given German citizenship while the remainder acquired foreign citizenship.

Between 1991 and 2003 14.2 million immigrants entered Germany while there were 9.6 million emigrants over the same period. The level of immigration peaked in 1992 (1.5 million) and in 2003 it fell below 800,000 for the first time over the period. Approximately one out of five immigrants and emigrants are German citizens, the remainder are non-nationals. Net immigration has been positive over the period 1991 to 2003 apart from 1997 and 1998 although it has been falling since 2001. There are four main groups of immigrants. First, ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and the ex-USSR; second, asylum seekers; third, refugees from the ex-Yugoslavia after 1991-92; and fourth, short-term labour migration,

including seasonal and contract workers, mainly from non-EU countries. The number of asylum seekers fell to 35,600 in 2004 which was 45% of the level in 2000.

Non-nationals are more concentrated in the former West Germany rather than the former GDR and mainly live in the larger cities. The majority of non-nationals (over 60%) have been resident in Germany for over 10 years and just over a third have lived there for over 20 years. Of the 7.3 million non-nationals living in Germany in 2003 slightly less than half (47%) were women. Non-nationals tend to be younger, with an average age of 34, compared with 42 for nationals. Moreover, the fertility rate of non-national women is higher, 1.8 births compared with 1.4 for national women, although the fertility rate of non-nationals is declining.

Germany introduced a new Residence Act on 1 January 2005 which aimed at simplifying the regulations relating to residency and created two kinds of residence permit: a temporary residence permit and a permanent settlement permit. Most foreigners living in Germany, however, fall into one of the former categories of residency. Of the 6.5 million non-nationals with the right to residency at the end of 2003 almost three-quarters (4.8 million) had either a temporary or permanent residence permit and another 770,000 had the right of unlimited residence. Of the remainder 340,000 were given residency for specific purposes and a further 260,000 for exceptional circumstances.

The activity rate of non-nationals has decreased by 10% over a 20 year period and whereas before the activity rate of non-nationals was higher than nationals the situation has now been reversed. Over the same period unemployment rates of non-nationals have risen and are now much higher than nationals. Turks, and especially Turkish women, have significantly higher unemployment rates, as well as higher rates than former Yugoslavs, which is also the case in other countries including Austria, Finland and France.

## **Greece**

From the 1950s to the late 1980s Greece was a country of emigration but since then it has become a destination country. Over the last 20 years the main groups of immigrants have been co-ethnic returnees (Pontians), ethnic Greeks from Albania, returning Greek migrants and migrants from non EU countries. It has been estimated that hundreds of thousands of immigrants entered Greece without documentation (Gropas and Triandafyllidou 2005). The regularisation programme of 1998 resulted in 371,641 applications for a white card or limited duration permit but because of organisational and practical difficulties only 212,860 managed to apply for the temporary stay permit or green card of 1,2 or 5 year duration. Over 44% of those applying for regularisation were living in the metropolitan area of Athens. Albanians accounted for more than half of the applicants (52.7%) and of the remainder 6.1% were Pakistanis, 4.8% Bulgarians, 4.5% Romanians and 4.5% were Poles. There were more female applicants among the Bulgarian, Polish, Ukrainian and Filipino groups (ibid.). A second regularisation programme was introduced in 2001 which resulted in 370,000 applications for legal status but this too was hampered by organisational problems. A new immigration bill came into force on 1<sup>st</sup> January 2006 which aims, among other things, to expedite the registration process.

According to the official censuses the foreign population of Greece increased from 167,000 (1.6%) in 1991 to 797,091 (7.3%) in 2001. The OECD estimated the foreign population, including irregular migrants, to be between 7.5% and 9.5% of the total population. The vast majority of migrants are from outside the EU15 (94%) and only 47,000 (6%) are citizens of the EU15. There are slightly more men than women (54.5% and 45.5%) among the migrant population. The most important reason for their migration, both men and women, is employment (54%) followed by family reunion (13%) and return to country of origin (6.5%).

Demographic ageing means that inward migration will remain important for the foreseeable future.

Albanian citizens are the largest group of foreigners according to the census accounting for 438,000 or 57% of all foreigners. Albanian migrants mainly work in construction (about a third) and agriculture (20%). Bulgarians are the second largest group of migrants (35,000) and a third work in agriculture and another third, mainly women, in the private care and house cleaning services sector.

Almost a half of the migrant population have secondary education while about 10% have higher education (ibid.). Albanian citizens have the lowest education and former Soviet citizens the highest. Women have the largest share in terms of higher education. Information gathered after the first regularisation programme indicates that approximately three quarters of the immigrant population of Athens were in low-skilled, temporary and irregular employment irrespective of their educational or professional background (ibid.7). Many are employed in manual work on a daily basis and sometimes by different employers. Few migrants are employed in the formal sector. It is difficult to estimate unemployment but the precarious nature of employment and the lack of regulation with respect to working conditions indicates a problem for some. The predominance of small businesses and practices of informality compound the problems of migrants.

Not only are migrants marginalised in employment they also experience social marginalisation. It is very difficult for migrants to obtain citizenship. It is expensive, requires ten years residence and is discretionary. Moreover, different migrant groups are treated differently with respect to naturalisation and other civil rights.

## **Italy**

In the period 1950 to 1980 about 7 million Italians emigrated but in the late 1970s the situation was reversed and since then the number of immigrants has increased rapidly. Immigrants enter primarily for employment (60%) and legal residency is generally based on having an employment contract. There are different official estimates of the number of legal immigrants, ranging from 1.4 to 1.7 million in 2001 but whichever figure is taken immigrants account for less than 3% of the population. Over half of immigrants live in the northern regions and two regions, Lombardy (Milan) and Lazio (Rome), account for over half of all immigrants. There is also a large irregular or undocumented immigrant population with estimates ranging from 250,000 to 340,000.

The proportion of female immigrants has marginally increased in the last decade and women now account for about 45% of the legal immigrant stock. However, in 2001 females dominated the migrant flows from the Philippines (66%), Poland (70%) and Peru (68%) while men dominated from Morocco (72%). The majority of immigrants are non-EU nationals and the main sources of origin are Africa, with Morocco as the largest single source, and Eastern and Central Europe. There has also been a significant increase in immigration from Asian countries since the mid-1990s (Calavita 2006).

The scale of the integration of immigrants in Italy can be measured in a number of ways. Only 25% of foreign residents have lived in Italy for 5 years or more although the proportion is rising. The data on naturalisation points in a similar direction. It is difficult to acquire citizenship, which is achieved either through marriage or ten years continuous residency, but it is increasing. Moreover, immigrants are increasingly integral to the labour market and they are likely to assume even greater importance for the economy as the birth rate is low and the native population is declining and ageing.

Although an increasing proportion of immigrant jobs are permanent and full-time, certain patterns and trends have emerged. Migrant workers tend to be concentrated in the most onerous and unattractive jobs with the lowest pay and they are disproportionately employed in the informal sector. In comparison with local workers, migrants are more likely to be employed in low-end jobs, have lower wages and worse working conditions (ibid.). Regular migrants are employed in most sectors of the economy but they are clustered in manufacturing, construction, agriculture, domestic service and other service activities. Construction workers are often employed on a daily contract. Agricultural work is seasonal and is dominated by migrant workers from Eastern Europe. In the southern regions Moroccans and other Africans are employed in crop harvesting and in fish farms often on a daily wage.

Migrant women, primarily from the Philippines, South America and more recently Eastern Europe, are concentrated in domestic service, including cleaning and care of the elderly and children. Many of these women are overqualified for the work they do. They are paid very low wages: ranging between EUR 400-600 per month for live-in helpers and between EUR1.30-6.50 for hourly work (ibid.). Pay rates vary according country of origin so that Filipinos, for example, are generally paid more than Sri Lankans.

## **Poland**

Poland has been a country of net outward migration since the 1950s and inward migration is relatively small. The 2002 census recorded 796,000 emigrants living abroad for more than 2 months while 85,500 immigrants (0.2% of the population) were residing in Poland. Over the period 1950 to 1989 immigration was low, between 1500 and 3000 annually. Since 1989 immigration has almost doubled to reach 7,740 in 2001. There is evidence that the gap is narrowing and Poland, since EU accession, is shifting from being a country of net emigration to one of net immigration and transit migration. The 2002 census revealed that most immigrants (74%) had permanent status and that 81% of migrants have Polish citizenship. Returning nationals are more or less equally divided between men and women and are mostly between 40 and 64 years of age. Poland now has small immigrant communities of Chinese, Vietnamese and Armenian origin

In recent years an increasing number of migrants to Poland have entered on a temporary permit and in 2003 28,767 (94%) out of 30,572 did so on this basis. In 2003 the largest group of temporary and permanent migrants were citizens of the former Soviet Union, mainly from Ukraine (8,456), Belarus (2,507), and the Russian Federation (2,081). The remaining immigrants came mainly from Bulgaria, Lithuania, Yugoslavia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. In addition Poland has received an increasing number of asylum applications, 8,100 in 2004, an increase of 81% since 2000. Most asylum seekers come from Chechnya but also in the recent past from Europe, Asia and Africa.

In general immigrants are better educated than nationals and 30% have higher education, which is 3 times the national average. The most frequent reasons for temporary inward migration according to the 2002 census are for family union/reunion (33%), employment (24%) and study (17%). The presence of foreign citizens in Poland is a relatively new trend and managing it has not so far been considered as a major social issue.

## **Portugal**

Portugal became a country of immigration in the 1970s but it is since the 1990s that the most profound changes in immigration have occurred. Portugal has a relatively small foreign

population although it has more than doubled since the early 1990s and had reached 2.3% of the total population in 2003. The net migration rate was 6.3 per thousand in 2001, 6.1 in 2003 and fell to 3.9 in 2005. Just over a quarter of foreign nationals are from other-EU countries and the remainder are mainly from the Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa or from Central and South America. Since the turn of the century there has been a growing migratory flow from Eastern Europe, mainly from Ukraine, Moldova, Romania and Russia. The majority of migrants live in urban areas where there are the most work opportunities, with the highest concentration in the Lisbon metropolitan area. Migrant workers employed in the agricultural sector are dispersed throughout the country. Other migrants, mainly retirees from the UK, Germany and the Netherlands, are concentrated in the Algarve.

Migrant workers are concentrated in the construction, agricultural and service sectors. Men are more likely to be employed in construction and women in office and domestic cleaning. The new wave of Eastern European migrants are also employed in these sectors and, although many of them are well qualified, they, like other third country migrants, generally occupy low paid, low status positions in the labour market.

The activity rates of foreign workers, both men and women, are slightly higher than the rates of nationals. At the same time, the unemployment rate for migrant men is more than twice the level of national men while for migrant women it is marginally higher than migrant men and almost twice that of national women. The highest rates of unemployment have been among African migrants since the 1990s.

Since 2003 the Portuguese government has begun to adopt a managed approach to migration (Fonseca and Ormond 2003). There are quotas and migrants are required to hold a work or residence permit. At the same time the authorities have been given more power to remove undocumented migrants.

## **Slovenia**

Slovenia has a relatively small foreign population. At the end of 2004 out of a total population of 2 million less than 44,000 were foreign citizens. The vast majority of the foreign-born population are from Europe and mainly from the former Yugoslav republics. Almost half (49%) of the foreign population is from Bosnia and Herzegovina, with a further 18% from Serbia and Montenegro and 16% from Croatia. Less than 3% of the foreign population are third country nationals.

Net migration to Slovenia has changed in the last few years. During the 1990s net migration was either marginally positive or negative but since then the trend has been for inward migration to increase. It was +2.5 per thousand in 2001, fell to +1.8 in 2003 and it reached +3.6 in 2005 which is very close to the EU-25 average. There is no information on the gender composition of migrants.

The number of asylum seekers rose rapidly in the second half of the 1990s and peaked at 9,244 in 2000. The biggest group of asylum seekers were from Iran and many of them arrived via Bosnia-Herzegovina. Since then Slovenia has introduced more restrictive regulations controlling asylum and this has contributed to a dramatic fall in the number of asylum seekers to 532 in 2002. So far, third country immigration has been very small and many migrants are part of a transient population on their way to the EU. There has, however, been a growth in the number of Chinese migrants, mainly working in restaurants, but apart from this, third country migrants are relatively few. A large part of labour migration to Slovenia has been temporary or seasonal and is mainly a response to labour shortages in the Slovenian economy. Ex-Yugoslav migrants are generally employed on short term contracts in construction, hotels and agriculture. More recently employers in Slovenia have turned to Slovakia as source of labour, mainly for construction. Given the demographic and social changes taking place in

Slovenia it is likely that migrant labour will have an important role if economic growth is to be sustained.

## **Spain**

Spain experienced outward migration from the 1950s to the mid-1970s. A period of return migration followed and more recently from the late 1970s, as the economy began to boom, Spain became a country of net immigration. In 1991 there were 0.35 million foreign residents (1% of the population) which increased to 1.1 million (2.7%) in 2001 and accelerated to almost 2.7 million (6%) by 2003. This growth of foreign immigration was faster than any other EU country and it is concentrated in Madrid, the Mediterranean coastal provinces and the Balearic and Canary islands. At the same time the origin of immigrants has changed with most of the growth coming from non-EU countries, mainly Africa (Morocco, Ecuador) and Latin America (Peru and Columbia). Immigration from Asia has also grown with Chinese forming the largest group followed by Pakistan, India and Philippines. Spain receives relatively few asylum seekers (5,500 in 2004) which is only 70% of the level in 2000. On average, immigrants are much younger than the national population, with about 60% of immigrants in the 20 to 44 age group and a disproportionate number of men in the 25-34 age range. Approximately 15% have studied at the tertiary level and 60% have secondary education.

Migrants represent 4.7% of the labour force and make a vital contribution to the economy. They are mainly concentrated in services (59%), construction (17%) and agriculture. There are, however, differences according to nationality. Thus, Filipino and Latin-American women mainly work in domestic service while African migrants are concentrated in agriculture. Overall there are more male immigrants than female but some immigrant flows are more male dominated (Africans and Pakistanis) and others female dominated (Latin-American and Philippines).

Official priorities in terms of immigration have centred on controlling the flows and little attention has been given to citizenship and integration. Foreigners are required to obtain a work permit to work legally although it has been estimated that as many as a third have neither a residence nor a work permit. In 2000 and 2001 a special amnesty process resulted in a large increase in work permits, most of them granted to immigrants in the service sectors. Access to citizenship is restricted although it is easier for certain origins, such as Latin Americans, than it is for others, such as sub-Saharan Africans who are often regarded as temporary immigrants (Rodriguez-Garcia 2005). According to the European Labour Force Survey, the unemployment rate of young workers aged 15-24 was relatively high in Spain but higher for native-born (23%) than foreign-born (21%). Taking the population of working age, unemployment rates of foreigners are slightly higher than nationals and much higher for particular groups such as Moroccans: 25.4% for men and 39.6% for women; the Rest of Africa: 20.2% and Latin America: 15.8%.

## **Sweden**

Out of a population of almost 9 million in 2004, non-nationals accounted for 5.3% of the total, split in the ratio of 6:4 between non-EU nationals and other EU. According to data from Eurostat, the largest group of non-EU nationals residing in Sweden in 2000 were from CE Europe, including the ex-USSR, accounting for 28% of migrant men and 38% of migrant women. The net rate of immigration in Sweden fell in the 1990s from 2.3 per thousand in 1992 to 1.2 in 1998, and since then it increased to reach 3.2 per thousand between 2001 and

2003 and then fell back to 2.7 thousand in 2005. Sweden's net migration rate is below the average for the EU-15.

There has been a marked increase in employment for all women since 1997 related to the recovery in the labour market. Nevertheless, there is a considerable gap in the participation and unemployment rates of nationals and foreigners. The participation rate of men in 2002 was 78.0% for nationals but only 63.1% for foreigners while the corresponding unemployment rates were 5.5% and 16.1%. A similar gap between nationals and foreigners is found for women, with participation rates of 74.2% for national women and 60.3% for foreign women and corresponding unemployment rates of 4.6% and 13.0%. These average figures, however, hide the extent to which non-EU national women experience disadvantage. The unemployment rate of women born in the rest of the world, at 20% in 2003, was the highest of all groups. It is particularly high for Iraqi born migrants (27%). Moreover, the proportion of non-EU foreign women in employment is on average considerably lower than both national women and their foreign male counterpart and particularly low for Iraqis (38%).

Foreign workers are heavily concentrated in the property/real estate (including handymen and cleaners), hotel and restaurant, industry, food sales/manufacturing, personal and cultural services and caring sectors. Almost 50% of the care work in the Stockholm region is provided by foreign workers. Nelander et al. (2004) report that 30% of foreign born women are in temporary employment and the proportion is higher for those most recently arrived although the proportion has been falling in recent years. The proportion of women with basic education is higher for the foreign born compared with those born in Sweden. In contrast a larger proportion of foreign born women who came during the previous ten years have higher education compared with women born in Sweden. This indicates the skills and competences of many foreign born women are not being utilised. Moreover, at the same time there is also a need to further the education of those foreign women with only elementary education.

## **The United Kingdom**

The UK has changed from being a country of negative net immigration in the 1960s and 1970s to one of positive net immigration in the 1980s with sharp increases occurring from the mid-1990s (Hatton 2005: 1). In the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s net out-migration to the Old Commonwealth, mainly Australia and Canada, was declining while, until very recently, net immigration from the New Commonwealth (Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka and Pakistan) was positive but relatively stable at about 170,000 per decade. In contrast there was a strong upward trend in net migration from the EU during the 1980s and 1990s. In absolute terms immigration increased from 268,000 in 1992 to 582,000 in 2004. Emigration also increased over the period 1992 to 2004 from 281,000 to an estimated 360,000. Net migration reached 223,000 in 2004, 72,000 more than the previous year and the highest level since 1991. In 2004 net out-migration of British citizens reached a record level of 120,000 while net in-migration of non-British nationals also reached a record level of 343,000.

Net migration has become a major and growing reason for the expansion of population in the UK since the early 1990s. In 1993-94 net migration accounted for 31% of population growth in the UK and peaked at 85% in 2000-01 before falling to 62% in 2003-04. Almost 36% (123,000) of net immigrants in 2004 were citizens of the New Commonwealth (excluding Cyprus and Malta) while another 12% (41,000) were Old Commonwealth citizens. Migrants from the New Commonwealth country grouping of Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka accounted for 16% (54,000) of net immigration in 2004 while a further 7% (25,000) came from Pakistan. There has been an upward trend in net immigration from the EU since the early 1980s and in 2004 citizens of the EU25 accounted for over 21% (74,000) of total net immigration with almost two-thirds coming from the 10 countries that joined the EU in 2004.

The foreign-born population was estimated at 8.3% of the total UK population in 2001 (ONS 2003) and it is heavily concentrated in London. The proportion of foreign-born in the population of London was 27% in 2001 much higher than any other major city. The proportion of foreign-born was 9.3% for England, much higher than the 3.2% for Wales, 3.8% for Scotland and 4.1% for Northern Ireland (ibid.).

There are three main reasons for immigration to the UK. Firstly, for accompanying /family reunion which accounted for 106,000 (18%) of all immigrants in 2004; secondly, for work related reasons, 144,00 (25%); and thirdly, for study purposes, 136,000 (23%). The number of asylum seekers fell to 40,600 in 2004 which was 41% of the number in 2000. Almost two-thirds of immigrants since the mid-1990s have been single with a figure of 62% in 2004. Women make almost precisely half of in-migration. In 2003 84% of immigrants were of early or middle working age, aged between 15 and 44. Immigrants tend to be younger than emigrants and consequently lower the average age of the total population.

The labour market experiences of migrants and minorities in the United Kingdom vary greatly. Overall ethnic minorities have relatively low activity and employment rates and relatively high unemployment rates. The overall ethnic minority unemployment rate has remained almost twice that of the white population throughout the 1980s and 1990s and it is even higher for Black Caribbean, Black African, Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups. Unemployment levels for Indian and Chinese communities are closer to those of the white community. Some ethnic minority women have very low activity rates, for example, 19% for Bangladeshi women and 30% for Pakistani women. In recent years new migrants have increasingly been employed in a narrow range of sectors, often on short-term contracts in education, care, health, agriculture, food processing and the services sector.

## Appendix 2: Statistical Annexe

**Table 1: Trends in Total Migration, 1990-2005**

|                                      | Migrant stock <sup>1</sup> (millions) | 1990 | 2000 | 2005 |
|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|------|------|------|
| World total                          |                                       | 154  | 175  | 191  |
| Africa                               |                                       | 16   | 16   | 17   |
| Asia                                 |                                       | 50   | 50   | 53   |
| Europe <sup>2</sup>                  |                                       | 48   | 56   | 64   |
| Latin America and the Caribbean      |                                       | 7    | 6    | 7    |
| North America                        |                                       | 28   | 41   | 44   |
| Oceania                              |                                       | 5    | 6    | 5    |
| Proportion of women in migrant stock |                                       |      |      |      |
| World total                          |                                       | 47.9 | 48.6 | 49.8 |
| Africa                               |                                       | 45.9 | 46.7 | :    |
| Asia                                 |                                       | 42.9 | 43.3 | :    |
| Europe                               |                                       | 51.7 | 52.4 | :    |
| Latin America and the Caribbean      |                                       | 49.9 | 50.2 | :    |
| North America                        |                                       | 51.0 | 50.3 | :    |
| Oceania                              |                                       | 49.1 | 50.5 | :    |

Source: United Nations International Migration Stock, 2002 (UNPD 2002) and 2005 revision (UN 2005)

Notes:

1 The UN mostly uses census data to gather information on the place of birth of the population and then equates the international migrant stock with the foreign-born.

2 Europe includes EU25 and a further 21 countries mainly in eastern and south eastern Europe

**Table 2: Total foreign resident and immigrant population for EU 15, 2000-2002 using different data sources (in millions)**

|  |             |
|--|-------------|
| Total population (Eurostat, end 2002)            | 379.5       |
| Foreign resident (Chronos, 2000)                 | 18.7        |
| Foreign resident (OECD/Sopemi, 2001)             | 20.1        |
| Foreign born (UN, 2000)                          | 26.4        |
| Foreign born population (National sources, 2001) | 24.9        |
| Foreign born population (LFS, 2002)              | 22.7        |
| Foreign born (Munz, 2004)                        | 33.0 – 36.0 |

Source: Munz (2004:27)

**Table 3: 1 JANUARY 2003 - NATIONAL AND FOREIGN POPULATION IN EU25 MEMBER STATES (thousands)<sup>1</sup>**

|                               | <b>BELG</b> | <b>CZ</b>    | <b>DENMK</b> | <b>GER</b>   | <b>ESTONIA</b> | <b>GR</b>   | <b>SP</b>     |
|-------------------------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|----------------|-------------|---------------|
| Total Population              | 10.355,8    | 10.203,3     | 5.397,6      | 82.536,7     | 1.356,0        | 11.006,4    | 42.197,9      |
| Nationals                     | 9.503,9     | 10.076,4     | 5.126,4      | 75.656,5     | 1.084,5        | 10.239,2    | 39.425,7      |
| Other EU nationals            | 578,0       | 48,1         | 66,4         | 2085,9       | 4,0            | 79,5        | 578,8         |
| Non-EU25 nationals            | 274,0       | 78,8         | 204,8        | 4794,3       | 267,5          | 687,7       | 2193,4        |
| % Other EU                    | 5,58%       | 0,47%        | 1,23%        | 2,52%        | 0,29%          | 0,72%       | 1,37%         |
| % Non-EU 25                   | 2,64%       | 0,77%        | 3,80%        | 5,80%        | 19,72%         | 6,25%       | 5,20%         |
| % Total foreign (EU + Non EU) | 8,22%       | 1,24%        | 5,02%        | 8,32%        | 20,01%         | 6,97%       | 6,57%         |
|                               | <b>FR</b>   | <b>IRL</b>   | <b>IT</b>    | <b>CY</b>    | <b>LATVIA</b>  | <b>LITH</b> | <b>LUX</b>    |
| Total Population              | 59.635,0    | 3.963,6      | 57.321,1     | 715,1        | 2.319,2        | 3.462,6     | 448,3         |
| Nationals                     | 56.314,0    | 3.682,7      | 55.978,6     | 647,9        | 2.285,9        | 3.428,3     | 282,8         |
| Other EU nationals            | 1260,2      | 145,8        | 174,0        | 33,9         | 4,4            | 1,7         | 143,6         |
| Non-EU25 nationals            | 2060,8      | 135,2        | 1168,5       | 33,3         | 28,9           | 32,5        | 21,9          |
| % Other EU                    | 2,11%       | 3,67%        | 0,30%        | 4,74%        | 0,19%          | 0,05%       | 32,03         |
| % Non-EU 25                   | 3,45%       | 3,41%        | 2,04%        | 4,65%        | 1,25%          | 0,93%       | 4,88          |
| % Total foreign (EU + Non-EU) | 5,56%       | 7,08%        | 2,34%        | 9,39%        | 1,44%          | 0,98%       | 36,91         |
|                               | <b>HUNG</b> | <b>MALTA</b> | <b>NL</b>    | <b>AUSTR</b> | <b>POL</b>     | <b>PORT</b> | <b>SLOVEN</b> |
| Total Population              | 10.116,7    | 397,3        | 16.258,0     | 8.082,0      | 38.218,5       | 10.407,5    | 1.996,4       |
| Nationals                     | 9.986,6     | 389,7        | 15.555,85    | 7.366,7      | 37.518,4       | 10.173,6    | 1.951,1       |
| Other EU nationals            | 17,4        | 4,9          | 224,3        | 164,2        | 14,4           | 50,4        | 1,9           |
| Non-EU25 nationals            | 112,7       | 2,7          | 477,9        | 551,1        | 685,7          | 183,4       | 43,3          |
| % Other EU                    | 0,17%       | 1,23%        | 1,38%        | 2,03%        | 0,04%          | 0,48%       | 0,10%         |
| % NON EU 25                   | 1,11%       | 0,67%        | 2,94%        | 6,81%        | 1,79%          | 1,80%       | 2,17%         |
| % Total foreign (EU + Non EU) | 1,29%       | 1,90%        | 4,32%        | 8,84%        | 1,83%          | 2,28%       | 2,27%         |

|                                  | <b>SLOVAK</b> | <b>FIN</b> | <b>SWED</b> | <b>UK</b> | <b>TOTALS</b>  |
|----------------------------------|---------------|------------|-------------|-----------|----------------|
| Total Population                 | 5.379,2       | 5.219,7    | 8.975,7     | 59.328,9  | 455.298,5      |
| Nationals                        | 5.276,1       | 5.112,7    | 8.499,6     | 56.592,7  | 432.155,8      |
| Other EU nationals               | 11,8          | 34,6       | 207,0       | 1016,6    | 6.951,8        |
| Non-EU nationals                 | 91,3          | 72,5       | 269,1       | 1719,6    | 16.190,9       |
|                                  |               |            |             |           | <b>AVERAGE</b> |
| % Other EU                       | 0,22%         | 0,66%      | 2,31%       | 1,71%     | 1,52%          |
| % Non-EU 25                      | 1,70%         | 1,39%      | 3,00%       | 2,89%     | 3,55%          |
| % Total foreign (EU +<br>Non-EU) | 1,92%         | 2,05%      | 5,30%       | 4,60%     | 5,07%          |

1 Source: Eurostat estimates. Other EU nationals includes citizens from new Member States, even though data refers to a year before accession

**Table 4: National and non-national population in the European Union Member States, around 2004 and 1990.**

|                | Year  | Nationals<br>(1000) | Non-<br>nationals<br>(1000) | Non-<br>nationals<br>% | Largest group of non-<br>nationals (country of<br>Citizenship) | Year | Nationals<br>(1000) | Non-<br>nationals<br>(1000) | Non-<br>nationals<br>% |
|----------------|-------|---------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------|--|------|---------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------|
| Belgium        | 2004  | 9 536               | 860                         | 8.3                    | Italy  | 1990 | 9 067               | 881                         | 8.9                    |
| Czech Republic | 2004  | 10 016              | 195                         | 1.9                    | Ukraine  | 1990 | 10 327              | 36                          | 0.3                    |
| Denmark        | 2004  | 5 126               | 271                         | 5.0                    | Turkey   | 1990 | 4 985               | 151                         | 2.9                    |
| Germany        | 2004  | 75 190              | 7 342                       | 8.9                    | Turkey   | 1990 | 74 267              | 4 846                       | 6.1                    |
| Estonia        | 2000c | 1 096               | 274                         | 20.0                   | Russia   | 1990 | :                   | :                           | :                      |
| Greece         | 2004e | 10 149              | 891                         | 8.1                    | Albania  | 1990 | 9 979               | 142                         | 1.4                    |
| Spain          | 2004  | 39 426              | 2 772                       | 6.6                    | Ecuador  | 1990 | 38 428              | 398                         | 1.0                    |
| France         | 1999c | 55 258              | 3 263                       | 5.6                    | Portugal   | 1990 | 53 055              | 3 597                       | 6.3                    |
| Ireland        | 2002c | 3 585               | 274                         | 7.1                    | United Kingdom   | 1990 | 3 426               | 81                          | 2.3                    |
| Italy          | 2004  | 55 898              | 1 990                       | 3.4                    | Albania  | 1990 | 56 338              | 356                         | 0.6                    |
| Cyprus         | 2002c | 625                 | 65                          | 9.4                    | Greece   | 1992 | 577                 | 26                          | 4.2                    |
| Latvia         | 2004  | 1 804               | 515                         | 22.2                   | Russia   | 1998 | 1 788               | 671                         | 27.3                   |
| Lithuania      | 2001c | 3 450               | 34                          | 1.0                    | Russia   | 1990 | :                   | :                           | :                      |
| Luxembourg     | 2004  | 277                 | 174                         | 38.6                   | Portugal   | 1990 | 270                 | 109                         | 28.7                   |
| Hungary        | 2004  | 9 987               | 130                         | 1.3                    | Romania  | 1995 | 10 199              | 138                         | 1.3                    |
| Malta          | 2004  | 389                 | 11                          | 2.8                    | United Kingdom   | 1990 | 352                 | 6                           | 1.6                    |
| Netherlands    | 2004  | 15 556              | 702                         | 4.3                    | Turkey   | 1990 | 14 251              | 642                         | 4.3                    |
| Austria        | 2004  | 7 375               | 765                         | 9.4                    | Serbia & Mont.   | 1990 | 7 211               | 434                         | 5.7                    |
| Poland         | 2002c | 37 530              | 700                         | 1.8                    | Germany  | 1990 | :                   | :                           | :                      |
| Portugal       | 2003p | 10 169              | 239                         | 2.3                    | Cape Verde   | 1990 | 9 819               | 101                         | 1.0                    |
| Slovenia       | 2004  | 1 951               | 45                          | 2.3                    | Bosnia & Herzeg.   | 1995 | 1 942               | 48                          | 2.4                    |
| Slovakia       | 2004  | 5 350               | 30                          | 0.6                    | Czech Republic   | 1990 | :                   | :                           | :                      |
| Finland        | 2004  | 5 113               | 107                         | 2.0                    | Russia   | 1990 | 4 953               | 21                          | 0.4                    |
| Sweden         | 2004  | 8 500               | 476                         | 5.3                    | Finland  | 1990 | 8 071               | 456                         | 5.3                    |
| United Kingdom | 2003  | 55 636              | 2 760                       | 4.7                    | Ireland  | 1990 | 55 043              | 2 416                       | 4.2                    |
| EU25           |       | 428 992             | 24 885                      | 5.8                    |  |      |                     |                             |                        |

c - Census data; e – Estimated figures; p – Provisional data.

Source: Eurostat, Statistics in focus — Population and social conditions — 8/2006

**Table 5: Non-EU nationals living in the Union by citizenship, 2000**

|                        |      | <i>% non-EU nationals</i> |           |            |             |            |            |            |           |              |
|------------------------|------|---------------------------|-----------|------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|-----------|--------------|
| <b>Women</b>           |      |                           |           |            |             |            |            |            |           |              |
|                        |      | <b>B</b>                  | <b>DK</b> | <b>GER</b> | <b>GR</b>   | <b>SP</b>  | <b>FR</b>  | <b>IRL</b> | <b>IT</b> |              |
| CE Europe plus ex-USSR |      | 11.8                      | 27.5      | 37.5       | 82.3        | 7.2        | 8.0        | 16.2       | 26.9      |              |
| Turkey, Malta, Cyprus  |      | 19.8                      | 13.9      | 40.4       | 7.0         | 0.2        | 8.0        | 10.5       | 0.1       | Other        |
| Europe                 | 0.5  | 13.2                      | 1.2       | 0.4        | 1.8         | 1.0        | 0.0        | 0.6        |           | Africa       |
|                        | 48.7 | 10.8                      | 3.3       | 1.7        | 32.9        | 67.7       | 0.0        | 28.3       |           |              |
| Others                 |      | 19.2                      | 34.5      | 17.6       | 8.5         | 57.9       | 15.3       | 73.3       | 44.1      |              |
|                        |      | <b>LUX</b>                | <b>NL</b> | <b>AUS</b> | <b>PORT</b> | <b>FIN</b> | <b>SWE</b> | <b>UK</b>  | <b>EU</b> |              |
| CE Europe plus ex-USSR |      | 52.1                      | 12.2      | 66.4       | 5.5         | 71.3       | 37.9       | 8.6        | 27.1      |              |
| Turkey, Malta, Cyprus  |      | 0.9                       | 27.4      | 21.1       | 0.0         | 1.4        | 3.9        | 2.8        | 21.8      |              |
| Other Europe           |      | 4.6                       | 2.3       | 0.9        | 0.0         | 3.5        | 12.8       | 1.6        | 1.6       |              |
| Africa                 |      | 13.6                      | 27.9      | 1.0        | 70.3        | 6.1        | 8.0        | 18.1       | 22.1      |              |
| Others                 |      | 28.8                      | 30.1      | 10.5       | 24.2        | 17.7       | 37.5       | 68.9       | 27.4      |              |
| <b>Men</b>             |      |                           |           |            |             |            |            |            |           |              |
|                        |      | <b>B</b>                  | <b>DK</b> | <b>GER</b> | <b>GR</b>   | <b>SP</b>  | <b>FR</b>  | <b>IRL</b> | <b>IT</b> |              |
| CE Europe plus ex-USSR |      | 7.7                       | 26.8      | 31.7       | 81.0        | 9.9        | 6.8        | 28.8       | 23.3      | Turkey,      |
| Malta, Cyprus          | 17.5 | 11.7                      | 44.5      | 2.9        | 0.2         | 8.9        | 3.5        | 0.5        | 0.8       | Other Europe |
|                        | 0.8  | 15.6                      | 0.8       | 0.1        | 0.3         | 0.8        | 0.0        | 0.8        |           | Africa       |
|                        | 57.1 | 6.5                       | 5.8       | 4.6        | 43.0        | 69.5       | 0.0        | 40.5       |           | Others       |
|                        | 16.9 | 39.3                      | 17.2      | 11.4       | 46.6        | 14.0       | 67.7       | 34.9       |           |              |
|                        |      | <b>LUX</b>                | <b>NL</b> | <b>AUS</b> | <b>PORT</b> | <b>FIN</b> | <b>SWE</b> | <b>UK</b>  | <b>EU</b> |              |
| CE Europe plus ex-USSR |      | 56.4                      | 7.4       | 63.7       | 6.8         | 59.1       | 28.3       | 6.7        | 23.9      |              |
| Turkey, Malta, Cyprus  |      | 0.0                       | 31.0      | 23.3       | 0.0         | 6.2        | 7.2        | 5.4        | 25.3      |              |
| Other Europe           |      | 4.3                       | 2.0       | 1.2        | 0.4         | 0.9        | 13.4       | 1.1        | 1.3       |              |
| Africa                 |      | 13.7                      | 34.5      | 1.7        | 70.0        | 13.5       | 7.9        | 18.1       | 24.3      |              |
| Others                 |      | 25.6                      | 25.1      | 10.3       | 22.9        | 20.2       | 43.2       | 68.7       | 25.2      |              |

Source: Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, 2/2003

**Table 6: Citizenship composition of non-national population in selected EU Member States.**

**GERMANY**

| 1990           | (1000) | %    | 2004           | (1000) | %    |
|----------------|--------|------|----------------|--------|------|
| Turkey         | 1612.6 | 33.3 | Turkey         | 1877.6 | 25.6 |
| BA+HR+MK+CS+SI | 610.5  | 12.6 | BA+HR+MK+CS+SI | 1054.7 | 14.4 |
| Italy          | 519.5  | 10.7 | Italy          | 601.3  | 8.2  |
| Greece         | 293.6  | 6.1  | Greece         | 355.6  | 4.8  |
| Poland         | 220.4  | 4.5  | Poland         | 326.9  | 4.5  |
| Other          | 1589.1 | 32.8 | Other          | 3119.6 | 42.5 |

**PORTUGAL**

| 1990           | (1000) | %    | 2003          | (1000) | %    |
|----------------|--------|------|---------------|--------|------|
| Cape Verde     | 28.0   | 27.7 | Cape Verde    | 52.4   | 21.9 |
| Brazil         | 10.5   | 10.4 | Brazil        | 24.9   | 10.4 |
| United Kingdom | 7.8    | 7.7  | Angola        | 24.6   | 10.3 |
| Spain          | 7.3    | 7.2  | Guinea Bissau | 19.1   | 8.0  |
| US             | 6.4    | 8.4  | United Kingd. | 15.9   | 6.7  |
| Other          | 41.0   | 40.6 | Other         | 101.9  | 42.7 |

**LUXEMBOURG**

| 1991     | (1000) | %    | 2004     | (1000) | %    |
|----------|--------|------|----------|--------|------|
| Portugal | 37.6   | 34.2 | Portugal | 63.8   | 36.6 |
| Italy    | 19.9   | 18.1 | France   | 21.9   | 12.6 |
| France   | 13.0   | 11.8 | Italy    | 18.9   | 10.8 |
| Belgium  | 9.5    | 8.6  | Belgium  | 16.0   | 9.2  |
| Germany  | 8.8    | 8.0  | Germany  | 10.3   | 5.9  |
| Other    | 21.3   | 19.4 | Other    | 43.3   | 24.9 |

**GREECE**

| 1994           | (1000) | %    | 2001     | (1000) | %    |
|----------------|--------|------|----------|--------|------|
| US             | 15.1   | 10.1 | Albania  | 438.0  | 57.5 |
| United Kingdom | 13.5   | 9.0  | Bulgaria | 35.1   | 4.6  |
| Russia         | 10.3   | 6.9  | Georgia  | 22.9   | 3.0  |
| Germany        | 9.2    | 6.2  | Romania  | 22.0   | 2.9  |
| Poland         | 8.8    | 5.9  | US       | 18.1   | 2.4  |
| Other          | 92.4   | 62.0 | Other    | 225.3  | 29.6 |

**CZECH REPUBLIC**

| 2004     | (1000) | %    |
|----------|--------|------|
| Ukraine  | 56.4   | 28.9 |
| Slovakia | 33.1   | 17.0 |
| Vietnam  | 25.6   | 13.1 |
| Poland   | 16.1   | 8.2  |
| Russia   | 12.5   | 6.4  |
| Other    | 51.7   | 26.5 |

**HUNGARY**

| 2004    | (1000) | %    |
|---------|--------|------|
| Romania | 55.7   | 42.8 |
| Ukraine | 13.1   | 10.1 |
| CS      | 12.4   | 9.5  |
| Germany | 7.4    | 5.7  |
| China   | 6.8    | 5.2  |
| Other   | 34.8   | 26.7 |

**SLOVAKIA**

| 2004           | (1000) | %    |
|----------------|--------|------|
| Czech Republic | 5.4    | 18.0 |
| Ukraine        | 4.8    | 16.1 |
| Poland         | 2.4    | 7.9  |
| Romania        | 1.9    | 6.5  |

**SLOVENIA**

| 2004    | (1000) | %    |
|---------|--------|------|
| BA      | 21.8   | 48.2 |
| CS      | 7.6    | 16.8 |
| Croatia | 7.0    | 15.4 |
| MK      | 4.1    | 9.0  |

|         |      |      |         |     |     |
|---------|------|------|---------|-----|-----|
| Vietnam | 1.8  | 5.9  | Ukraine | 0.9 | 1.9 |
| Other   | 13.6 | 45.6 | Other   | 3.9 | 8.7 |

BA - Bosnia and Herzegovina, HR - Croatia, MK –Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, CS – Serbia and Montenegro, SI – Slovenia,  
 US – United States of America.

Source: Eurostat, Statistics in focus — Population and social conditions — 8/2006

**Table 7: Net Migration rates, for selected countries and years 1992-2005 (per thousand)**

|          | 1992 | 1995 | 1998 | 2001 | 2003 | 2005 |
|----------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| EU-25    | 2.5  | 1.6  | 1.4  | 2.9  | 4.6  | 3.7  |
| EU-15    | 3.3  | 2.1  | 1.8  | 3.5  | 5.4  | 4.2  |
| Germany  | 9.6  | 4.9  | 0.6  | 3.3  | 1.7  | 1.2  |
| Greece   | 9.1  | 7.3  | 5.1  | 3.5  | 3.2  | 3.1  |
| Spain    | 1.4  | 1.5  | 3.8  | 10.5 | 17.6 | 15.0 |
| France   | 0.6  | -0.3 | -0.1 | 1.0  | 0.9  | 1.7  |
| Italy    | 0.5  | 0.6  | 1.1  | 0.8  | 10.4 | 5.8  |
| Cyprus   | 17.5 | 10.1 | 6.2  | 6.6  | 17.2 | 27.2 |
| Poland   | -0.3 | -0.5 | -0.3 | -0.4 | -0.4 | -0.3 |
| Portugal | -0.5 | 2.2  | 3.2  | 6.3  | 6.1  | 3.9  |
| Slovenia | -2.8 | 0.4  | -2.8 | 2.5  | 1.8  | 3.6  |
| Sweden   | 2.3  | 1.3  | 1.2  | 3.2  | 3.2  | 2.7  |
| UK       | 0.8  | 2.0  | 3.6  | 3.1  | 4.4  | 3.3  |

Source: 1992-2003 Europe in Figures, Eurostat Yearbook 2005; 2005 Eurostat, First demographic estimates for 2005

**Table 8: Indicators of the recent feminisation of migration flows**

|                | % of women among immigrants<br>arrived for 10 years or less |      |
|----------------|---|------|
|                | 2004  | 1994 |
| Austria        | 56  | 48   |
| Belgium        | 54  | 52   |
| Czech republic | 54  | ..   |
| Germany        | 53  | 48   |
| Denmark        | 48  | 42   |
| Spain          | 51  | 55   |
| Finland        | 53  | ..   |
| France         | 54  | 54   |
| Greece         | 52  | 54   |
| Hungary        | 54  | ..   |
| Ireland        | 50  | 51   |
| Italy          | 55  | 49   |
| Luxembourg     | 51  | 46   |
| Netherlands    | 53  | 48   |
| Norway         | 56  | ..   |
| Poland         | 61  | ..   |
| Portugal       | 57  | 57   |
| Sweden         | 53  | 50   |
| United Kingdom | 50  | 54   |

Notes: Data for Germany are for 1992 and for Austria and Sweden for 1995

Source: Oso and Garson (2005)

**Table 9: Acquisition of Citizenship in selected EU countries for selected years**

|          | 1990  | 1995    | 2000   | 2003    | 2003<br>% of total<br>population |
|----------|-------|---------|--------|---------|----------------------------------|
| Germany  | 20078 | 71981   | 186688 | 154547* | 0.19                             |
| Spain    | 7033  | 6756    | 16743  | 26517   | 0.00006                          |
| France   | 54381 | 92410   | 94002# | 139938  | 0.24                             |
| Italy    | 555   | 7442    | na     | 13406   | 0.02                             |
| Portugal | 97    | 80      | 1143   | 255*    | 0.002                            |
| Sweden   | 16770 | 35065** | 43474  | 37792*  | 0.004                            |
| UK       | 57271 | 40516   | 82210  | 124295  | 0.21                             |

Source: Europe in Figures, Eurostat Yearbook 2005

Notes: \* Figure for 2002; # Figure for 1999; \*\* Figure for 1994

**Table 10 - Unemployment rate in OECD countries (Target countries in bold)**

|                       | Participation rate |             |             |             | Unemployment rate |             |             |             |
|-----------------------|--------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
|                       | Men                |             | Women       |             | Men               |             | Women       |             |
|                       | Nationals          | foreigners  | nationals   | foreigners  | nationals         | foreigners  | nationals   | foreigners  |
| Austria               | 78.9               | 85.1        | 62.4        | 63.3        | 3.9               | 8.4         | 3.9         | 8.6         |
| Belgium               | 73.3               | 72.4        | 57.0        | 41.0        | 4.6               | 14.2        | 7.0         | 16.5        |
| Czech Republic        | 78.7               | 87.8        | 63.3        | 56.3        | 7.1               | 7.6         | 10.1        | 12.5        |
| Denmark               | 84.1               | 71.2        | 76.2        | 53.0        | 3.6               | 12.2        | 4.9         | 7.2         |
| Finland               | 79.4               | 83.1        | 74.6        | 60.2        | 10.0              | 24.2        | 11.2        | 29.9        |
| <b>France</b>         | <b>75.1</b>        | <b>76.6</b> | <b>63.3</b> | <b>48.6</b> | <b>7.1</b>        | <b>17.1</b> | <b>10.7</b> | <b>23.9</b> |
| <b>Germany</b>        | <b>78.9</b>        | <b>77.6</b> | <b>64.7</b> | <b>50.7</b> | <b>7.2</b>        | <b>13.4</b> | <b>7.8</b>  | <b>11.7</b> |
| <b>Greece</b>         | <b>76.2</b>        | <b>89.2</b> | <b>49.0</b> | <b>56.0</b> | <b>7.2</b>        | <b>7.6</b>  | <b>16.2</b> | <b>17.6</b> |
| Hungary               | 67.6               | 77.8        | 52.2        | 51.8        | 6.4               |             | 4.9         | 5.5         |
| Ireland               | 79.2               | 77.0        | 55.9        | 56.2        | 4.1               | 5.1         | 3.8         | 6.2         |
| <b>Italy</b>          | <b>73.6</b>        | <b>87.7</b> | <b>46.6</b> | <b>50.7</b> | <b>8.0</b>        | <b>7.4</b>  | <b>13.9</b> | <b>21.3</b> |
| Luxembourg            | 74.0               | 79.7        | 47.7        | 57.7        | 1.2               | 2.5         | 1.7         | 3.8         |
| Netherlands           | 84.9               | 69.5        | 67.2        | 49.0        | 1.9               | 4.7         | 2.9         | 7.0         |
| Norway                | 84.6               | 82.1        | 76.8        | 67.2        | 3.7               | 5.3         | 3.4         | 4.5         |
| <b>Portugal</b>       | <b>79.0</b>        | <b>81.5</b> | <b>64.0</b> | <b>65.3</b> | <b>3.1</b>        | <b>8.4</b>  | <b>5.1</b>  | <b>9.6</b>  |
| Slovakia              | 76.9               | 79.4        | 63.2        | 51.8        | 19.8              | 26.2        | 18.6        | 17.0        |
| <b>Spain</b>          | <b>77.3</b>        | <b>85.4</b> | <b>50.9</b> | <b>59.1</b> | <b>9.3</b>        | <b>12.9</b> | <b>19.8</b> | <b>17.2</b> |
| <b>Sweden</b>         | <b>78.0</b>        | <b>63.1</b> | <b>74.2</b> | <b>60.3</b> | <b>5.5</b>        | <b>16.1</b> | <b>4.6</b>  | <b>13.0</b> |
| Suisse                | 89.2               | 89.5        | 73.3        | 68.6        | .3                | 4.3         | 2.6         | 6.4         |
| <b>United Kingdom</b> | <b>83.1</b>        | <b>75.6</b> | <b>68.4</b> | <b>55.8</b> | <b>5.5</b>        | <b>9.8</b>  | <b>4.4</b>  | <b>7.9</b>  |

Source: Silke Steinhilber, Labour Force surveys, Eurostat, cited in OECD 2003.

**Table 11: Immigrants and minorities in employment: Main concentration in sectors, industries and branches**

|                                |   |  |   |  |  |
|--------------------------------|---|--|---|--|--|
| <b>Sectors</b>                 | <b>AUS</b><br>Industry  | <b>BEL</b>   | <b>DK</b><br>Personal and public services (1/3); commerce, clerical work and catering (22%); industry (20%)               | <b>FIN</b><br>Service, industries, cleaning and caring   | <b>FR</b><br>Services (75% of all immigrants); industry incl construction (15%)  |
| <b>Industries and branches</b> | Construction, Metal industries<br>Textiles, clothing and leather industries, agriculture, tourism, cleaning | Metal industry; agri- and horticulture; advice and assistance; fabrication of transport means  |   | Catering (15%) and metal, electronic and wood industries (15%), cleaning (9%), caring (8%), construction industry (6%) | Semi-finished goods; capital equipment; car building; textile & clothing; hotel services   |
| <b>Sectors</b>                 | <b>GER</b><br>Manufacturing (37%), construction (7%), services (33%), commerce (5%)                         | <b>GRE</b><br>Agriculture construction, transport  | <b>IRL</b><br>Services (37%) catering (25%) agriculture and fisheries (15%) industry (7%) medical and nursing sector (7%) | <b>ITA</b><br>Services (49%) industry (36%) agriculture (15%)  | <b>LX</b>  |
| <b>Industries and branches</b> | Mining, industrial production, catering, laundry cleaning   | Domestic help  |   |  | Com. hotel & catering (22%) construction (18%); real estate & prof. services 13%); fin. services (12%); Other services (17%); industry (10%) |
| <b>Sectors</b>                 | <b>NL</b><br>Services, industry, public sector  | <b>PORT</b><br>Services (22%); industry transforming sector (14%);   | <b>SPAIN</b><br>Agriculture, building industry, hotel and catering, domestic help   | <b>SWE</b>   | <b>UK</b><br>Services  |
| <b>Industries and branches</b> | Personal services   | Construction (40%); hotels & restaurants (11%); trade sector<br><br>trade sector (8%); agriculture, fisheries and extraction sector (4%) |   | Personal and cultural services caring<br><br>transport and communications; public health; education                    | Textiles, clothing restaurant ind; sector communica- (8%);   |

Source: EUMC, 2003

**Table 12: Employment of women by nationality in some economic activities (%)**

|                                   | 1994       |           | 2004       |           |
|-----------------------------------|------------|-----------|------------|-----------|
|                                   | Foreigners | Nationals | Foreigners | Nationals |
| <b>Household Services</b>         |            |           |            |           |
| Spain                             | 27.1       | 6.9       | 36.0       | 4.6       |
| France                            | 14.7       | 3.5       | 21.1       | 3.8       |
| Greece                            | 35.0       | 1.5       | 42.2       | 1.3       |
| Italy                             | 10.3       | 2.3       | 27.9       | 1.6       |
| United Kingdom                    | 3.7        | 1.1       | 3.1        | 0.6       |
| <b>Health and social services</b> |            |           |            |           |
| Belgium                           | 14.5       | 19.3      | 15.9       | 22.4      |
| Germany                           | 11.9       | 11.7      | 15.7       | 19.6      |
| Denmark                           | 37.6       | 28.9      | 27.4       | 32.6      |
| France                            | 10.5       | 16.9      | 12.1       | 20.3      |
| United Kingdom                    | 21.0       | 18.8      | 25.0       | 20.6      |
| <b>Hotel and restaurant</b>       |            |           |            |           |
| Germany                           | 10.8       | 3.2       | 11.5       | 3.8       |
| Spain                             | 24.4       | 7.1       | 19.0       | 7.5       |
| France                            | 8.5        | 3.6       | 6.0        | 3.4       |
| Greece                            | 12.2       | 6.4       | 16.3       | 7.4       |
| United Kingdom                    | 8.5        | 5.7       | 7.6        | 5.2       |
| <b>Education</b>                  |            |           |            |           |
| Belgium                           | 6.8        | 15.3      | 7.5        | 14.8      |
| Germany                           | 3.4        | 7.9       | 5.7        | 8.8       |
| Spain                             | 9.5        | 9.8       | 3.8        | 10.2      |
| France                            | 4.8        | 11.3      | 6.8        | 10.5      |
| Italy                             | 16.1       | 14.8      | 4.2        | 14.0      |
| United Kingdom                    | 12.5       | 11.4      | 11.4       | 14.4      |
| <b>Retail Trade</b>               |            |           |            |           |
| Belgium                           | 15.8       | 13.2      | 12.6       | 11.8      |
| France                            | 7.7        | 9.7       | 6.5        | 10.0      |
| Italy                             | 12.6       | 13.8      | 6.2        | 12.3      |
| Luxembourg                        | 11.1       | 15.4      | 10.1       | 8.6       |
| United Kingdom                    | 10.1       | 14.2      | 10.9       | 14.4      |

Source: Oso and Garson (2005)